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THE CONCURRENT SENTENCE DOCTRINE DIES A
QUIET DEATH-OR ARE THE REPORTS GREATLY
EXAGGERATED?
ANNE S. EMANUEL*
The concurrent sentence doctrine is a judicially-created rule of
criminal procedure. In this article, Professor Emanuel traces the
history of the doctrine from its roots in eighteenth-centiry England
to its current status in state and federal courts. Recently, the United
States Supreme Court effectively forestalled the use of the doctrine
in any federal felony conviction; however, Professor Emanuel
argues that the doctrine remains viable in collateral actions for
postconviction relief from federal convictions and in state courts.
T HE CONCURRENT sentence doctrine provides that once a re-
viewing court has affirmed a conviction and sentence in an ap-
peal brought by a defendant in a criminal case, the court need not
consider the defendant's challenge to any convictions on additional
counts which bear concurrent sentences of the same or a lesser term.
The doctrine, a judicially created rule of federal criminal procedure,'
arose when the United States Supreme Court made a curious leap of
logic from a questionable, if well-established rule,2 to a tenuously
*Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University; B.A.; 1967, Old Dominion
University; J.D., with distinction, 1975, Lamar School of Law, Emory University. The author
would like to thank Dean Marjorie Knowles and Georgia State University for supporting this
project with a research grant; and Anne Summerlin and Keith Richardson, whose able service
as research assistants greatly facilitated the completion of this paper.
1. The limited use of the doctrine by state courts is discussed infra text accompanying
notes 219-43.
2. See Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140 (1891). Claassen stands for two rulings:
first, that a conviction based on a verdict of guilty on each count of a multiple-count indict-
ment is valid as long as the verdict on any single count is sufficient; and second, that even if
the conviction on one or more of the counts cannot stand, the defendant has no right to
resentencing. See infra text accompanying notes 25-35. Logic impels the first ruling; in theory,
each verdict is separate and severable. Quaere, however, whether the sheer volume of counts
might not be prejudicial. See United States v. Rosen, 764 F.2d 763, 767 (11th Cir. 1985) (re-
ferring to the holistic nature of a sentencing decision), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986);
McGee v. United States, 462 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1972) (remanding for a determination of
whether the conviction on a subsequently vacated count had influenced the trial court's sen-
tence on the remaining three counts). Logic does not support the second ruling. The sentence
is based on the entire verdict; if part of the verdict is flawed, then whenever the sentence
exceeds the minimum that can be imposed, the possibility arises that the sentence was based in
part on a verdict which cannot stand. There is, of course, a "catch-22." To insure that the
sentence was not affected by an invalid verdict, the verdict on each count would have to be
examined. Thus the first ruling in Claassen would have no practical effect.
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related doctrine founded on a troublesome assumption.3 Numerous
challenges to the doctrine have arisen, including the arguments that
the use of the doctrine abrogates a federal defendant's right to ap-
peal; that it infringes upon a defendant's right to substantive due
process; that when courts choose to vacate instead of affirming the
unreviewed conviction they offend the doctrine of separation of
powers; and that the doctrine's raison d'etre, judicial economy, is
not well served by its exercise. The Supreme Court, however, has not
reconsidered the validity of the concurrent sentence doctrine since it
delineated its scope in Benton v. Maryland4 in 1969.
When the Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari in Novem-
ber of 1986 in order to consider the role of the concurrent sentence
doctrine in the federal courts, it appeared that at least some of the
substantive questions surrounding the doctrine would be answered.'
Instead, in a two-paragraph opinion, the Court in Ray v. United
States6 vacated the sentences and remanded, ruling that because the
defendant's convictions each carried a $50 assessment, the sentences
were not concurrent and the doctrine could not be applied.7 Since the
assessments were levied pursuant to a federal statute which imposes a
minimal monetary assessment on all federal convictions,' the interac-
tion of the statute and the ruling in Ray forecloses the application of
the concurrent sentence doctrine on direct review in the federal
courts. Notwithstanding the opinion in Ray, the doctrine remains vi-
able in collateral federal postconviction proceedings and in the state
courts. Thus, challenges to its validity deserve attention.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE CONCURRENT SENTENCE DOCTRINE
A brief account of the history of the concurrent sentence doctrine
is a valuable aid to a clear understanding of its intricacies. The ori-
3. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Pierce v. United States, 252
U.S. 239 (1920). In Claassen, the Court was confronted with a single conviction based on a
verdict of guilty on each of several counts of an indictment. The Court determined that at
least one of the counts supported the conviction and refused to consider a challenge. Hirabay-
ashi transmuted that ruling into a refusal to consider the validity of separate convictions
where they carried concurrent sentences of an equal or lesser term to a conviction which was
affirmed. Hirabayashi assumes that additional convictions (as opposed to the sentences they
carry) have no effect on a defendant. As a general proposition this is questionable, although it
may have been true of Hirabayashi himself in view of the fact that he deliberately violated
certain military orders to challenge their constitutionality.
4. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
5. United States v. Ray, 107 S. Ct. 454 (1986).
6. 107 S. Ct. 2093 (1987).
7. Id.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3013 (Supp. III 1982).
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gins of the doctrine can be traced to eighteenth-century England. In
a line of cases beginning in the early nineteenth-century, American
courts expanded upon these English roots and formulated the mod-
ern version of the doctrine.
A. English Historical Antecedents
The United States Supreme Court attributed the origin of the con-
current sentence doctrine to four eighteenth-century English cases. 9
In the earliest of the four, Regina v. Ingram,0 a jury convicted a
husband and wife of the crimes of assault and battery. The indict-
ment charged: "vi et armis insultum fecit verberaverunt, vulneraver-
unt, etc."" On appeal the couple contended that because "insultum
fecit" ("he made an attack") was singular, it did not charge both of
them with an assault and it was uncertain whom it did charge. The
court upheld the verdict because if the challenged words had been
omitted the indictment would have charged both with a battery
which necessarily includes assault. 2 In Rex v. Benfield,3 two defen-
dants who were convicted of a libel for "singing in the street songs
reflecting on [the] prosecutor's children," moved for arrest of judg-
ment. They complained that the jury had found them guilty on a
general verdict on a count of the information that enumerated as
libelous several songs, and that one of the songs set-forth was not
libelous. The court found that the song at issue was libelous, but
went on to say, in dicta, "that if this part of the charge had not been
9. In Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140, 146 (1891), the Court stated, "In criminal
cases, the general rule, as stated by Lord Mansfield before the Declaration of Independence,
is 'that if there is any one count to support the verdict, it shall stand good, notwithstanding all
the rest are bad.' Peake v. OIdham, Cowper, 275, 276; Rex v. Benfield, 2 Bur. 980, 985. See
also Grant v. Astle, 2 Doug. 722, 730." Grant v. Astle, 99 Eng. Rep. 459 (K.B. 1781), states
the same rule, citing Regina v. Ingram, 91 Eng. Rep. 335 (Q.B. 1712). See also Note, The
Concurrent Sentence Doctrine: Sound Judicial Procedure or Illegitimate Shortcut?, 1981 U.
ILL. L. REV. 723, 724 nn.6-7 [hereinafter Note, Judicial Procedure]; Comment, The Collateral
Consequences Exception to the Concurrent Sentence Doctrine, 44 TEMPLE L.Q. 385, 387 n.13
(1971); Note, The Federal Concurrent Sentence Doctrine, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1099, 1100 nn.5-
6 (1970) [hereinafter Note, Federal Doctrine].
10. 91 Eng. Rep. 335 (K.B. 1712).
11. Id. The charge translates as follows: "with forces and arms he made an attack, they
lashed [or whipped], they wounded [or injured], etc." The author is indebted to Associate
Justice Charles L. Weltner of the Supreme Court of Georgia for the translation.
12. Id. The court recognized that in civil cases, where the jury finds general damages on a
multicount pleading and one or more counts fail, the judgment must be set aside because the
court cannot apportion the damages. In this case, however, the court would assess the fine,
and, in the words of Chief Justice Parker, "[T]hey will set it only according to those facts
which are well laid. If an offence sufficient to maintain the indictment be well laid, it is
enough." Id.
13. 97 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1760).
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so, it would, in an information or indictment, only go towards less-
ening the punishment; but would not be a sufficient reason for ar-
resting the judgment. 1' 4 Benfield does not cite Ingram, and stands
for a different proposition. In Benfield, the defendants were charged
with a crime for singing several separate songs, all of which were set
out in the same count; the court seems to assume that the jury found
all of the songs libelous. The rule announced in Benfield logically
also would obtain if each song were the subject of a separate count,
and a general verdict of guilty were returned. Indeed, in two civil
cases, Grant v. Astle5 and Peake v. Oldham,16 Lord Mansfield
stated that the rule did apply to multicount indictments.
Astle involved an action in assumpsit to recover fines from the
holder of a number of customary tenements. The first and second
counts sought the same damages, and the jury returned a verdict for
that amount. On appeal, the court found Astle's attack on the sec-
ond count meritorious. Lord Mansfield agreed that the verdict must
be set aside, but remarked:
I have exceedingly lamented, that ever so inconvenient and ill-
founded a rule should have been established, as that, where there
are several counts, entire damages, and one count is bad, and the
others not, this shall be fatal .... And what makes this rule
appear more absurd, is, that it does not hold in the case of criminal
prosecutions; for, when there is a general verdict of guilty, on an
indictment consisting of several counts, if any one of them is good,
that is held to be sufficient. 17
Earlier, in Oldham, an action for slander, Lord Mansfield had re-
marked:
However in civil cases the rule most certainly is settled, that where
a verdict is taken generally and any one count is bad, it vitiates the
whole. It has always struck me that the rule would have been much
more proper to have said, if there is any one count to support the
verdict, it shall stand good, notwithstanding all the rest are bad. In
criminal cases the rule is so .... 1
Interestingly, in Oldham, Lord Mansfield offered no citation for
the rule he stated. When he reiterated the rule six years later in Astle,
14. Id. at 667.
15. 99 Eng. Rep. 459 (K.B. 1781).
16. 98 Eng. Rep. 1083 (K.B. 1775).
17. Astle, 99 Eng. Rep. at 466.
18. Oldham, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1084.
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he attributed it to Ingram; however, Ingram does npt support such a
broad rule. Instead he could have cited Benfield.19
B. American Historical Antecedents
In America, the concurrent sentence doctrine can be traced to
Locke v. United States20 and Claassen v. United States.21 Locke ap-
pealed a judgment for the government on an eleven-count libel con-
viction. 22 Citing no authority, the Court ruled: "The information
consists of several counts, to all of which exceptions are taken. The
Court, however, is of opinion, that the 4th count is good, and this
renders it unnecessary to decide on the others. ' ' 23 Since each count
carried the same penalty, forfeiture of the cargo, no concurrent sen-
tences were at issue. Additionally, the libel in Locke was not a crimi-
nal prosecution, although the Supreme Court later referred to a
similar proceeding as quasi-criminal. 24 Claassen, however, involved
the criminal prosecution of the president of a national banking asso-
ciation. 25 Claassen was tried on eleven counts; the jury acquitted him
of six and found him guilty of the offenses charged in the remaining
five. The statute provided as the sentence for any single offense not
less than five nor more than ten years imprisonment; Claassen was
sentenced to six years in the penitentiary. On appeal, the Court re-
viewed his conviction on the first count and found it valid. The
Court then ruled that because the verdict of guilty on the first count
was "sufficient to support the judgment and sentence, the question
of the sufficiency of the other counts need not be considered." 26 The
19. In Benfield, the court indicated that the failure of some of the allegations in a count
of an information to state a crime would not affect the judgment of guilty, but would affect
sentencing. 97 Eng. Rep. 664, 667 (K.B. 1760). This is ironic given the case's role as an histor-
ical antecedent of the concurrent sentence doctrine.
20. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813).
21. 142 U.S. 140 (1891).
22. Count One, which charged a violation of the embargo law, was abandoned by the
government. Counts Two through Six charged violations of the general collection laws.
Counts Seven through Eleven charged violations of the non-importation acts.
23. Locke, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 344.
24. See Clifton v. United States, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 242, 250 (1846). The Court stated,
citing Locke: "[I]t was held, at an early day, in this court, that one good count was sufficient
to uphold a general verdict and judgment upon all the counts, though some of them might be
bad, the information being regarded in the nature of a criminal proceeding." Id. See also
Taylor v. United States, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 197, 210 (1845) ("In one sense, every law imposing
a penalty or forfeiture may be deemed a penal law; in another sense, such laws are often
deemed, and truly deserve to be called, remedial.").
25. Claassen was charged in a 44-count indictment with violating § 5209 Revised Statutes
(1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 591-92 (1982)) (repealed 1948). Claassen, 142 U.S. at 141-42.
26. Id. at 146.
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Court cited both English and American case law, notably, Locke.
The Claassen Court noted that "the jury did not return a general
verdict against the defendant on all the counts, but found him guilty
of the offences charged in each of the five counts now in ques-
tion." 2 7 Claassen's treatment of the conviction's validity is perfectly
sound even today;28 however, its alleged antecedents are question-
able. The English cases stated the rule in dicta; in fact, this rule of
criminal procedure is quoted from a civil case. 29 Likewise, of the
four American cases cited, two involve a general verdict,30 and a
third, Locke, appears to do the same, although the opinion is not
clear on that point. The fourth is a civil action sounding in assumpsit
and controlled by an Illinois statute."
Claassen affirms not only the conviction but also the sentence.32
Claassen was in fact sentenced to a term of six years.33 Arguably,
reason enough exists to require resentencing; a sentence might well
be influenced by the multiplicity of convictions and the sentence im-
posed was not the minimum provided for by law.3 4 Nonetheless, the
27. Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
28. See 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 527 (1982); cf. Cramer v.
United States, 325 U.S. 1, 36 n.45 (1945):
The verdict in this case was a general one of guilty, without special findings as to
the acts on which it rests. Since it is not possible to identify the grounds on which
Cramer was convicted, the verdict must be set aside if any of the separable acts
submitted was insufficient.
See also Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359
(1931). In Leary the Court, citing Stromberg, noted: "It has long been settled that when a
case is submitted to the jury on alternative theories the unconstitutionality of any of the theo-
ries requires that the conviction be set aside." 395 U.S. at 31-32.
29. Claassen quotes Peake v. Oldham, 98 Eng. Rep. 1083 (K.B. 1775), an action for
slander. See supra text accompanying note 18. The Claassen court also cites Grant v. Astle, 99
Eng. Rep. 459 (K.B. 1781), a case involving an action for assumpsit, in which Lord Mansfield
reiterates the rule in dicta. This time, however, Lord Mansfield provides a citation to Regina
v. Ingram, 91 Eng. Rep. 335 (K.B. 1712), a criminal case, which, unfortunately, does not
stand for the proposition for which it is cited. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12 & 19.
Finally, the court in Claassen cites Rex v. Benfield, 97 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1760), a criminal
case which does stand for a very similar proposition. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14
& 19. Benfield is, however, far broader than Claassen. It does not seem to require more than a
general verdict; that is, it does not require a finding that a defendant is guilty on a particular
count, or even of an act in a count, on the basis of which conviction can be sustained.
30. Snyder v. United States, 112 U.S. 216 (1884); Clifton v. United States, 45 U.S. (4
How.) 242 (1846).
31. Bond v. Dustin, 112 U.S. 604, 609 (1884).
32. Claassen, 142 U.S. at 147.
33. Id. at 143.
34. See supra note 2; see also Recent Cases, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 726, 727 (1959):
Concurrent sentences are awarded with an awareness of the multi-count convic-
tion and are imposed with this in mind. Thus, concurrent sentences imposed for a
conviction of eleven offenses may not be identical in terms of length with the sen-
tence which would be imposed if only one of the eleven offenses were properly sus-
tainable.
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Claassen rule is still viable, although its impact on the sentence as
opposed to the conviction has rarely been addressed by the United
States Supreme Court."
C. The Inception of the Modern Doctrine
Claassen, of course, is not a concurrent sentence doctrine case for
the simple reason that no concurrent sentence was involved; Claassen
received only one six-year term. The Claassen rule, however, was
soon applied in a case involving concurrent sentences-Pierce v.
United States.36
Pierce was convicted on four counts of an indictment. 37 He was
separately sentenced on each count, with the sentences to run con-
currently. On appeal, the United States abandoned one of the counts
on which Pierce had been convicted. Nonetheless, the Court ex-
pressly declined to set aside the sentence on that count, stating:
The conceded insufficiency of the first count of the indictment does
not warrant a reversal, since the sentences imposed upon Pierce
... did not exceed that which lawfully might have been imposed
under the second, third or sixth counts, so that the concurrent
sentence under the first count adds nothing to [his] punishment. 38
Pierce led, inexorably, to Hirabayashi v. United States,39 which
states the concurrent sentence doctrine in its most common and most
pure form. Hirabayashi was charged in a two-count indictment with
violating a statute which made it a misdemeanor "knowingly to dis-
regard restrictions made applicable by a military commander to per-
sons in a military area." 40 The regulations applied only to people of
Japanese ancestry. Count One charged a failure to report to a Civil
35. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420 & n.42 (1970). General sentences
are, however, disfavored. "It has been correctly said of the general sentence that there is
,universal recognition that the practice, while permissible, is unsatisfactory."' 3 C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 527, at 113 (1982) (quoting Benson v. United States,
332 F.2d 288, 290 (5th Cir. 1964)).
36. 252 U.S. 239 (1920). In United States v. Hines, 256 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1958), the
Second Circuit stated that applying Claassen to Pierce "appears to be error." Id. at 563.
37. The original indictment contained six counts, but two were struck by agreement at
the trial. Three of the defendants, including Pierce, were convicted on all four remaining
counts; the fourth defendant was convicted on only one of the counts. Pierce, 252 U.S. at
240, 242.
38. Id. at 252-53. None of the reported opinions in this case indicates the length of the
sentences. Id.; United States v. Pierce, 245 F. 878 (N.D.N.Y. 1917) (on demurrer); Pierce v.
United States, 245 F. 888 (N.D.N.Y. 1917) (on motion for bill of particulars).
39. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
40. Id. at 83.
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Control Station to register for evacuation; Count Two charged viola-
tion of a curfew. Hirabayashi was convicted and sentenced to three
months imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concur-
rently. On appeal he contended, inter alia, that the orders were un-
constitutional because they discriminated against people of Japanese
ancestry. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the appeal to
the United States Supreme Court. 41 The Court upheld the curfew or-
der and Hirabayashi's conviction for violating it-declining to con-
sider the conviction on the first count on the ground that it was
unnecessary to do so since the convictions carried concurrent sen-
tences.42 Thus the concurrent sentence doctrine enabled the court to
avoid addressing the constitutionality of the military orders which
resulted in relocation and internment of the Japanese during World
War II.
II. FROM HIRABA YASHI TO BENTON
The concurrent sentence doctrine flourished in the twenty-five
years following the Hirabayashi decision. During this period the cir-
cuit courts of appeal viewed the doctrine as a means of furthering
judicial convenience. However, the Supreme Court's decision in Ben-
41. The Ninth Circuit also certified the question of whether the restrictions were adopted
by the military commander in the exercise of an unconstitutional delegation by Congress of its
legislative power. Id. at 84-85.
42. Id. at 105. More than forty years later, Hirabayashi filed a writ of coram nobis seek-
ing to vacate the convictions. The district court vacated the conviction for failing to report,
but found the conviction for violation of the curfew valid. Hirabayashi v. United States, 627
F. Supp. 1445 (W.D. Wash. 1986), aff'd in part, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987). The district
court opinion makes no mention of the concurrent sentence doctrine. One of the requisites for
the writ, however, is that the defendant suffer present adverse consequences as a result of the
conviction. The court found that Hirabayashi satisfied that condition because of the admit-
tedly "highly unlikely" possibility that the conviction might be used to impeach him, and
because of the fact that if he:were to be convicted of another crime, the 1942 conviction could
be a factor in sentencing Id. at 1445.
Use of the concurrentsentence doctrine permitted the Supreme Court to avoid considera-
tion of not only the reporting orders issued against Japanese Americans, but also of the con-
comitant relocation orders. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 105. The Court again declined to
review the constitutionality of the relocation orders in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 221-22 (1944). Claims by Japanese Americans for "damages and declaratory relief for
the tangible and intangible injuries suffered" because of relocation again evaded review more
than four decades later. United States v. Hohri, 107 S. Ct. 2246, 2247 (1987).
It appears that the constitutionality of the relocation orders may never be decided, consider-
ing that Congress recently passed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 102,
100 Stat. 903, 904-05 (1988) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1989) in which Congress, inter alia,
apologized to those individuals of Japanese ancestry who were evacuated, relocated and in-
terned, offering each eligible person $20,000 in settlement of all claims against the United
States.
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ton v. Maryland4a signaled an abrupt end to this period and the be-
ginning of a new era for the doctrine.
A. The Concurrent Sentence Doctrine in the Federal Courts
The concurrent sentence doctrine serves but one master, the judici-
ary. 4" In those cases where a defendant challenges all of his convic-
tions, a prosecutor briefing the case on appeal cannot safely forego
all other avenues of argument and rely 'on the doctrine because he
cannot be certain which convictions will be affirmed. Should the de-
fendant challenge only one of several convictions, the prosecutor
cannot be confident that the concurrent sentence doctrine will apply
since it is not a jurisdictional bar. 45 The defendant, of course, has no
need for it; he can simply decline to appeal any or all of his convic-
tions. The reviewing court, however, enjoys a significant benefit.
For example, on the appeal of convictions on five counts of an in-
dictment, the court may have to only review the challenges to one of
the convictions. Additionally, the quantitative reduction in work
may be eclipsed by the qualitative reduction in that the most trouble-
some contentions may be easily avoided.46 Thus it is not surprising
that the doctrine enjoyed widespread acceptance in the federal circuit
courts of appeal once it had received the imprimatur of the Supreme
Court in Hirabayashi.47
Not all courts, however, were equally convinced of the validity of
the doctrine. In 1958, a Second Circuit opinion, United States v.
Hines, noted that the Supreme Court never had explained the basis
on which it decided to apply the Claassen doctrine to concurrent sen-
tences.48 Additionally, the Second Circuit criticized the apparent
presumptions "that a district judge does and should give the same
punishment on one-count convictions as he does on multicount con-
victions, and that a defendant's punishment is no greater so long as
43. 395 U.S. 784 (1968).
44. Of course the concurrent sentence doctrine, like any rule of judicial economy, bene-
fits litigants (and society) in general by reducing the congestion of clogged court dockets and
speeding the resolution of issues in litigation. See id. at 798-99 (White, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 791. While Benton clarified this aspect of the doctrine, even before Benton it
was not generally perceived as jurisdictional. See, e.g., United States v. Hines, 256 F.2d 561,
563 (2d Cir. 1958).
46. There can be no better example of this than Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81 (1943). See supra note 42.
47. See, e.g., the cases collected in Note, Judicial Procedure, supra note 9, at 729 n.52;
Note, The Concurrent Sentence Doctrine After Benton v. Maryland, 7 UCLA-ALASKA L.
REV. 282, 283 n.10 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Benton v. Maryland]; Note, Federal Doctrine,
supra note 9, at 1101 n.16.
48. 256 F.2d 561, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1958).
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he must stay in prison for the same period of time." '49 Finally, the
court noted that the doctrine took into account neither the stigma
nor the effect on parole of multiple convictions. The court then an-
nounced that it would entertain an appeal from convictions carrying
concurrent sentences "whenever the nature of the error committed
below or other circumstances suggest that the accused might have
received a longer sentence than otherwise would have been imposed,
or that he has been prejudiced by the results of the proceedings." 50
Hines did not stand alone in indicating that the doctrine could be
applied only absent a showing of prejudice.5 On occasion a court
would forego application of the doctrine because the issues raised
deserved consideration.12 For the most part, however, for a quarter
of a century after Hirabayashi, the doctrine was alive and well in the
federal courts.
B. Benton v. Maryland-A Reprieve
Benton v. Maryland is best known for its holding that the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment "represents a fundamental
ideal in our constitutional heritage" and applies to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. 3 To make that ruling, however, the
Court first had to address the state's contention that the concurrent
sentence doctrine deprived the Court of jurisdiction, since Benton's
double jeopardy claim only affected a conviction for larceny carry-
ing a five-year sentence which ran concurrently with a fifteen-year
sentence for burglary. Recognizing that it had indicated at times that
49. Id. at 563.
50. Id. Hines had been convicted on three counts of a four-count indictment, and sen-
tenced to three concurrent three-year terms. He challenged only the conviction on one of the
counts. The court reversed because of error in the jury instruction, vacated the sentence on
the remaining two counts and remanded for resentencing. See infra text accompanying notes
95-103.
Despite the clarity of the Hines opinion, it did not result in a consistent approach, even in
the Second Circuit. See United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952, 956-57 (2d Cir. 1980).
51. See Saville v. United States, 400 F.2d 397, 399 (1st Cir. 1968) (applying the doctrine
where "there is nothing to suggest that defendant received a larger sentence than would have
been imposed had there been only one count"), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 980 (1969); Chavez v.
United States, 387 F.2d 937, 939 (9th Cir. 1967) (applying the doctrine where there is no
suggestion of prejudice); Smith v. United States, 335 F.2d 270, 271-72 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (de-
clining to apply the doctrine where the defendant alleged that his conviction on one count was
based on evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment and that evidence had preju-
diced the jury's consideration of the other two counts).
52. See Aron v. United States, 382 F.2d 965, 972 n.2 (8th Cir. 1967) (discussing fourth
amendment challenges because of their "sensitiveness" notwithstanding the concurrent sen-
tence doctrine).
53. 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). Benton overruled Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937).
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application of the doctrine was mandatory, the Court admitted
nonetheless having applied the doctrine "somewhat haphazardly"
and having never proffered a "satisfactory explanation" for the
doctrine 4 before holding that it does not state a jurisdictional rule.
The fact that a challenged conviction carries a concurrent sentence
of equal or lesser term than a valid conviction does not render the
controversy moot. 5 In reaching that conclusion, the Court relied in
part on four recent cases which had "canvassed the possible adverse
collateral effects of criminal convictions' ":56 Street v. New York;5 7
Sibron v. New York;5" Carafas v. LaVallee; 9 and Ginsberg v. New
York. 60 The cited cases refer to possible adverse legal consequences
such as civil disabilities, including an impact on one's right to vote
or to hold certain licenses, as well as the possibility that an unrev-
54. One might anticipate that having made that comment the Court would go on to fash-
ion a "satisfactory explanation"; instead, it dismissed the topic in the introductory clause to
the next sentence: "But whatever the underlying justifications for the doctrine .... " Benton,
395 U.S. at 789-90.
55. See St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 43 (1943), where the Court recognized
that if a petitioner could show "that under either state or federal law further penalties or
disabilities [could] be imposed on him," the case would not be moot. The St. Pierre Court,
however, specifically disallowed the potential for impeachment and stigma as disabilities, rul-
ing, "Petitioner also suggests that the judgment may impair his credibility as witness in any
future legal proceeding. But the moral stigma of a judgment which no longer affects legal
rights does not present a case or controversy for appellate review." Id. at 43.
56. Benton, 395 U.S. at 790 n.5. The Benton court uses the phrases "adverse collateral
legal consequences" and "possible adverse collateral effects" interchangeably. Arguably the
latter phrase is broader, and includes the stigma that inheres in any criminal conviction, even
absent a discernible practical or legal effect. See United States v. Hines, 256 F.2d 561, 563 (2d
Cir. 1958). None of the cases cited in this portion of the Benton opinion refers to this general-
ized stigma, although in combination they list an extensive range of possible adverse legal
consequences.
57. 394 U.S. 576, 579-80 n.3 (1969). In Street, the Court noted that the appellant's con-
viction subjected him to an actual threat of temporary loss of employment-two months sus-
pension without pay. In addition, he was subject to possible collateral penalties such as having
his conviction used to rebut character evidence in any future criminal proceeding, the possibil-
ity of a heavier sentence for any future criminal conviction, and the possibility that a future
felony conviction might result in his being sentenced as a habitual offender.
58. 392 U.S. 40, 54-55 (1968). In a canvass of cases where possible collateral conse-
quences prevented the appeal from being moot, the Court was influenced by the following
facts; an alien convicted of "moral turpitude" might be subject to deportation or have diffi-
culty proving "good moral character" in seeking U.S. citizenship, Fiswick v. United States,
329 U.S. 211 (1946); the possibility of heavier penalties in subsequent convictions or having
civil rights affected, United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); and the possibility of
having a business license revoked, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
59. 391 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1968). The Court found the petitioner's conviction prohibited
him from engaging in certain businesses, serving as a labor union official for a certain period,
voting in state elections, or serving as a juror.
60. 390 U.S. 629, 633-34 n.2 (1968). Under state and local laws, the appellant could have
the license necessary for operating his luncheon business revoked.
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iewed conviction might be used in the future to enhance punishment
or to impeach credibility. 61
According to Benton, then, the concurrent sentence doctrine is a
rule of judicial convenience, not a jurisdictional rule. Thus a review-
ing court faced with a challenge to a conviction bearing a concurrent
sentence may exercise its discretion in deciding whether to consider
the challenge. Discretion must be guided, and its exercise must be
principled. What guidelines are to govern the court's decision mak-
ing? Clearly the court must evaluate the potential for adverse collat-
eral effects. Benton indicates that such potential always exists: "In
Sibron v. New York . . . [w]e noted 'the obvious fact of life that
most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal
consequences. ' "62 This would seem to conclude the matter; if poten-
tial for adverse collateral legal consequences exists (and that poten-
tial always exists) the concurrent sentence doctrine should not be
applied. The Court, however, went on to consider whether the po-
tential adverse legal consequences might be so remote that they
should be treated as a species of harmless error. And the lid of the
casket into which the concurrent sentence doctrine had just been laid
sprung open.
One of the more questionable aspects of the Court's treatment of
the concurrent sentence doctrine in Benton is the determination by
the majority that it would be inappropriate to apply the concurrent
sentence doctrine to Benton himself.6 The Court does not turn to an
analysis of the potential adverse legal consequences, perhaps because
contending with the harmless error analogy is difficult. Most, if not
all, civil disabilities will accrue pursuant to the burglary conviction,
61. Use of the conviction for impeachment may be considered a civil disability in cases
where the defendant is simply a witness; impeachment might also occur, however, in a future
criminal prosecution of the defendant. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 790-91 (1969).
62. Id. (citation omitted). The Benton Court does not address the issue of who has the
burden of proof as to the existence of potential adverse collateral consequences. That issue
had, however, been addressed in a series of cases involving the issue of mootness rather than
the concurrent sentence doctrine. In St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943), the Court
implied that the burden lay on the defendant. Sibron v. United States, 392 U.S. 40, 55 (1968),
however, holds that a presumption exists that a conviction carries collateral legal conse-
quences. Thus the burden would seem to be placed on the prosecution. The Benton Court's
reliance on Sibron would seem to indicate that a like presumption exists in concurrent sen-
tence doctrine cases, but the matter is by no means clear. Benton, 395 U.S. at 790-91; see
United States v. Warren, 612 F.2d 887, 896 (5th Cir. 1980) (Roney and Hill, J.J., dissenting in
part) (arguing the court should decide which party has the burden of persuasion on appeal).
63. According to one commentator, Benton's prior convictions spanned thirty years and
included four felonies. Note, Federal Doctrine, supra note 9, at 1107 n.56. Benton's attorney
was quoted as saying that "it is difficult to imagine a case less likely to have possible adverse
collateral consequences than Benton's." Id. (quoting Cramer, Concurrent Sentence Doctrine
Limited, 36 D.C. BAR J. 46, 50 (1969)).
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rendering the impact of the larceny conviction nugatory. The possi-
bility that Benton will be tried in the future in a jurisdiction which
would use the larceny conviction to enhance his punishment is admit-
tedly remote; 64 and were an attempt to impeach him to be made, the
trier of fact presumably would be capable of understanding that the
two convictions arose from the same series of acts. 65
The majority offers two reasons for its decision not to apply the
concurrent sentence doctrine: first, that the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals chose to address the larceny conviction on its merits indicates
that the state has some interest in preserving it; and second, that
both the status of the burglary conviction and the length of that sen-
tence are still in "some doubt." ' The first argument will be true of
nearly every case from the state courts that reaches the federal sys-
tem; either the state court will have affirmed the conviction or it will
no longer be at issue. 67 As for the second point, even were Benton to
prevail on his challenge to the length of the sentence, the burglary
conviction would still carry a ten-year sentence, twice as long as that
imposed on the larceny conviction. The likelihood that the convic-
tion itself would be set aside was remote. 61
Although the Benton Court gave lip service to the continuing vital-
ity of the concurrent sentence doctrine, it refused to apply the doc-
trine even though Benton seemed a particularly suitable case. As a
result, some commentators believed that Benton had "dealt a mortal
blow to the concurrent sentence doctrine." 69 That did not prove to
be the case. Benton, however, did signal the beginning of an era in
which the doctrine would be subjected to increased scrutiny, during
which a number of troubling questions would be raised. 70
III. THE CONCURRENT SENTENCE DOCTRINE AFTER BENTON
The Supreme Court has applied the concurrent sentence doctrine
only once since the Benton decision. An exhaustive survey of the rel-
64. Benton, 395 U.S. at 790-91.
65. Id. at 805-06 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But see id. at 791 (where the majority noted
that "a jury might not be able to appreciate this subtlety").
66. Id. at 792-93.
67. The fact that state courts rarely employ the concurrent sentence doctrine is discussed
infra text accompanying notes 219-22.
68. Benton, 395 U.S. at 804 n.6 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
69. Note, Benton v. Maryland, supra note 47, at 289 (citing Comment, supra note 9, at
385; Note, Federal Doctrine, supra note 9; Comment, Benton v. Maryland: A Further Exten-
sion of the Rights of the Individual in Criminal Proceedings, 18 KAN. L. REV. 309 (1970)).
70. "[Tlhere continues to be ferment about the use of the concurrent sentence doctrine."
3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 527, at 123 (1982).
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evant cases in the circuit courts of appeals, on the other hand, indi-
cates that the circuits have various views as to the applicability of the
doctrine with the Fifth Circuit being its staunchest proponent.
A. In the Supreme Court
Those who read Benton as sounding a death knell for the concur-
rent sentence doctrine were silenced in 1973 when the Supreme Court
applied the concurrent sentence doctrine in Barnes v. United States.7
Barnes had been convicted on two counts of possessing United States
Treasury checks which were stolen from the mail; two counts of
forging the checks; and two counts of uttering the checks, knowing
the endorsements to be forged. After affirming the convictions on
the possession counts, the Court applied the concurrent sentence
doctrine and declined to review the other convictions. 72 Barnes has
proven to be the last application of the doctrine by the United States
Supreme Court. In Andresen v. Maryland,73 decided in 1976, the
Court referred to the ongoing validity of the concurrent sentence
doctrine, but did not apply it.74 In Pinkus v. United States,75 the
Court reversed a decision in which the Ninth Circuit had relied on
the concurrent sentence doctrine, because the concurrent sentence in-
cluded not only a term of years but also a $500 fine. 76 Finally, in
Mariscal v. United States,77 the Court questioned the continuing va-
lidity of Pierce v. United States.7 1 In Pierce, the defendants were
convicted on four counts and sentenced to concurrent terms on each
of the counts; the Court declined to reverse their convictions on the
first count even though the government abandoned that count on ap-
peal. In Mariscal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendant's convic-
tions on ten counts of interstate transportation of property obtained
by fraud; it then applied the concurrent sentence doctrine to avoid
addressing "'rather complex issues'"79 and affirmed his convictions
on twelve counts of mail fraud. After Mariscal filed a petition for
71. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
72. Id. at 848 n.16. In Barnes' appeal, the Ninth Circuit also had applied the concurrent
sentence doctrine. Id. at 841.
73. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
74. The doctrine may not have been applicable. Id. at 469 n.4.
75. 436 U.S. 293 (1978).
76. Id. at 304-05. The Pinkus Court noted in a footnote, "The validity of the concurrent
sentence doctrine is not challenged here. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 791 (1969)."
Id. at 304 n.7.
77. 449 U.S. 405 (1981).
78,. 252 U.S. 239 (1920); see supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
79. This account is taken from the opinion of the Supreme Court. Mariscal, 449 U.S. at
405. The Ninth Circuit opinion was unpublished.
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writ of certiorari, the Solicitor General "confessed error" and con-
ceded that the mail fraud convictions were invalid. In response, the
Court granted the writ, vacated the judgment affirming the mail
fraud convictions, and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for
"reconsideration of the applicability of the 'concurrent sentence
doctrine' to a conviction conceded by the United States to be errone-
ous." 8 0 While the message seemed to be that the concurrent sentence
doctrine was not appplicable, the Court stopped short of simply
making that determination.
B. In the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal
Since Benton, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has rarely proven to be a hospitable home for the concurrent
sentence doctrine. In United States v. Hooper,8 shortly after Benton
was decided, the court accomodated its concern that "[t]he possibili-
ties of adverse collateral consequences cannot fairly be gainsaid,"
without abandoning the benefits to the court of the concurrent sen-
tence doctrine. The court adopted the then novel approach of vacat-
ing a conviction carrying a concurrent sentence; this, the court
reasoned, both protected the defendant and served the need for judi-
cial economy. 82 The next year, noting that while it had frequently
followed Hirabayashi in the past 3 it had often exercised its discre-
tion in favor of review, the court again opted for review "because of
the possible harmful effect on appellant of the myriad collateral con-
sequences of an improper double felony conviction." 8 4 The court did
not explain why it chose to review the concurrent convictions instead
of vacating them, but it may well have been the result of the govern-
ment's raising an objection to the sentences being vacated.85 Subse-
quently the court has opted sometimes to afford the defendant full
review,8 6 and sometimes to vacate the unreviewed convictions.8 7
80. Id. at 405-06.
81. 432 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
82. Id. at 605-06.
83. See United States v. Spears, 449 F.2d 946, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (citing Duckett v.
United States, 410 F.2d 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Greene v. United States, 246 F.2d 677 (1957),
vacated on other grounds, 358 U.S. 326 (1959)).
84. Spears, 449 F.2d at 949.
85. In a case decided nearly simultaneously, United States v. Miller, 449 F.2d 974 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), the court did vacate the concurrent convictions, noting that "the government pro-
fesses no interest in upholding appellant's remaining convictions." Id. at 980.
86. See United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 933 n.17 (D.C. Cir.) ("the vitality of
the concurrent sentences doctrine is rapidly waning"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972).
87. See United States v. Bush, 659 F.2d 163, 167-68 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v.
Durant, 648 F.2d 747, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Harris, 627 F.2d 474, 477 (D.C.
Cir.). cert. denied. 449 U.S. 961 (1980).
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The First Circuit rarely has used the concurrent sentence doctrine
since Benton focused attention on it.8" In 1972, the court in O'Clair
v. United States89 canvassed the possible adverse collateral conse-
quences of a conviction. The court noted that "even if no other disa-
bilities were incurred, there is always the extra stigma imposed upon
one's reputation," 90 and declined to apply the concurrent sentence
doctrine. The rationale of O'Clair has held sway. 9'
Since Benton, the Second Circuit on occasion has used the concur-
rent sentence doctrine. 92 More often, it has not. 93 In 1978, the court
88. But see United States v. Gordon, 634 F.2d 639, 643 (1st Cir. 1980).
89. 470 F.2d 1199 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973).
90. Id. at 1203.
91. With rare exceptions, the First Circuit has declined to apply the concurrent sentence
doctrine. E.g., United States v. Contenti, 735 F.2d 628, 632 n.3 (1st Cir. 1984); United States
v. Tashjian, 660 F.2d 829 (lst Cir.) (declining to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine in
part because the district court judge said that the total number of convictions was a factor in
the sentence on each of the four convictions), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981); United
States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 1981) (raising the concurrent sentence doctrine sua
sponte and then declining to apply it in order to decide the legal issue); United States v.
Moynagh, 566 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1977) (after satisfying itself that collateral consequences
would inure to the defendant's future detriment, the court reached the merits, reversed on
four counts, and remanded for resentencing on the remaining six), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 917
(1978). In United States v. Nightingale, 703 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1983), the court erroneously
announced that it was applying the concurrent sentence doctrine. The court reviewed a convic-
tion on two counts. After affirming on the first count, the court announced, "The concurrent
sentence doctrine renders a discussion of the second count moot." But the judgment line then
read, "Affirmed as to Count One." Id. at 14. Since the conviction on the second count was
not affirmed, the concurrent sentence doctrine was not technically applied.
Finally, in one case the First Circuit applied the rule in principle. In Vanetzian v. Hall, 562
F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1977), a prisoner whose petition for writ of habeas corpus had been denied
by the district court petitioned the First Circuit for a certificate of probable cause. The court
recognized that no challenge to the conviction was presented. Thus, setting aside the chal-
lenged sentence would have no effect on the length of time the petitioner would remain in
prison because he was also serving longer concurrent sentences. The court denied relief on the
basis of the concurrent sentence doctrine. Id. at 90-91. The court, however, recognized it was
not declining to consider the validity of a conviction but only of a sentence.
92. See United States v. Moss, 562 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. United States v. Aptelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980); United States v. Vasquez, 468 F.2d
565 (2d Cir. 1972) (no prejudicial spillover), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973); United States
v. Gaines, 460 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.) (no prejudicial spillover), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 883 (1972);
United States v. Adcock, 447 F.2d 1337, 1339 (2d Cir.) ("no undesirable collateral conse-
quences would ensue"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); United States v. McGee, 426 F.2d
691, 700 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 479 (1971); United States ex rel. Weems v. Follette,
414 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969) (habeas corpus), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 950 (1970).
93. See United States v. Daley, 564 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1977) (declining to apply doctrine
because of collateral effects), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978); United States v. Beverhoudt,
438 F.2d 930, 932 (2d Cir. 1971) (declining to apply doctrine "to obviate any possibility of
future prejudice"); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1970) (expressing uncer-
tainty about the impact of Benton on the doctrine and declining to apply it because question
at issue is likely to recur), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971); United States v. Febre, 425 F.2d
107 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970).
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announced that "utilization of the concurrent sentence doctrine is
now the exception rather than the rule." ' 94 Then in 1980, in United
States v. Vargas,95 the court delivered an opinion exhaustively trac-
ing the history of the doctrine in the Second Circuit. Vargas divided
the opinions of the Second Circuit into a number of classes: those
that apply the doctrine with no further comment where no claim of
collateral consequences was made;96 those that apply it only after as-
certaining that there had been no prejudicial spillover; 97 those that
decline to apply the doctrine, with or without a stated reason; 9 those
that fail even to mention the potential for application of the doc-
trine;99 and those that first review the challenged conviction and then
invoke the doctrine, either as an alternative holding' °° or in order to
94. United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 361 (2d Cir. 1978). The court declined to apply
the doctrine in Ruffin because the sentence included a fine which was attributable to all three
counts on which the defendant was convicted. Id. at 361-62.
95. 615 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1980).
96. Id. at 956 (citing United States v. Vega, 589 F.2d 1147 (2d Cir. 1978); United States
v. Mejias, 552 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 (1977)).
97. Id. (citing United States v. Vasquez, 468 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 945 (1973); United States v. Gaines, 460 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 883
(1972)).
98. Id. at 956-57 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Febre, 425 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970); United States v. Delgado, 459 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1972)).
99. Id. at 957 (citing United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); McGee v. United States, 462 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1972)). In McGee,
the defendant was convicted on four counts of violating the Selective Service Act of 1967 and
sentenced to consecutive two-year terms on each count. In his first appeal, the court affirmed
the convictions on the first three counts and applied the concurrent sentence doctrine to avoid
considering the validity of the conviction on the fourth count. United States v. McGee, 426
F.2d 691, 700 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 479 (1971). Subsequently he successfully moved
to vacate the conviction and sentence on Count 1. He then moved to set aside the remaining
convictions and sentences; or, in the alternative, for a new trial on those counts; or, in the
alternative, to suspend or reduce the sentences. The trial court entered the following order
denying relief:
The defendant's and/or petitioner's motions to set aside the judgment of convic-
tion on Counts II, III and IV of the indictment and for an order pursuant to
Fed.R.Crim.P. 33 for a new trial are denied; and the motion for an order pursuant
to Fed.R.Crim.P. 35 reducing the sentence heretofore imposed [is] denied in the
exercise of our discretion.
McGee v. United States, 462 F.2d 243, 245 n.l (2d Cir. 1972). McGee appealed only the denial
of the motion to reduce sentence. The Second Circuit, concerned about the impact the vacated
conviction on the first count may have had on the sentences on the remaining three counts,
remanded for consideration of that issue. Id. at 247. When the trial court again denied relief,
the appellate court expressed disagreement with that action, but found it within the trial
court's discretion and affirmed. McGee v. United States, 465 F.2d 357, 358 (2d Cir. 1972).
Throughout these extended proceedings, the validity of the conviction on the fourth count was
never considered on appeal.
100. Vargas, 615 F.2d at 957 (citing United States v. Herrera, 584 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980); United States v. Hanlon, 548 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.
1977)).
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affirm a conviction which cannot stand on the merits.10 1 Although
this cataloguing of different approaches implies a certain degree of
criticism, the court excused itself, noting that "none of this is really
surprising, because . . . the Supreme Court itself has not exactly pro-
vided crystal-clear guidance on the subject." °0
The Vargas court went on to identify five factors which a court
must consider in order to determine whether to apply the doctrine:
the effect on a possible parole; the potential for impact of recidivist
statutes; the potential that the unreviewed conviction might be used
to impeach the defendant or to show a prior similar act in a future
prosecution; the effect on a possible pardon; and the potential for
stigma. The court then held without elaboration or citation that "the
Government should have the burden of persuading the appellate
court that the risk of collateral consequence is too slight to justify
review." 103 Of course, the government did not carry the burden in
Vargas and the court reached the merits; quaere how often the gov-
ernment could carry the burden as posited by the Second Circuit.
The Third Circuit has rarely used the concurrent sentence doctrine
since Benton, although in one case it did rule that the doctrine ap-
plied because "no appreciable risk of greater collateral conse-
quences" existed. 1°4 More often, the Third Circuit has found that an
appreciable risk exists, or that application of the doctrine is not eco-
nomical, or has simply declined to apply the doctrine without elabo-
ration. 105
Like the Third Circuit, the Fourth Circuit has rarely used the doc-
trine, although on occasion it has found the doctrine appropriate.10 6
More often the Fourth Circuit has declined to apply the doctrine,
101. Id. (citing United States v. DeNoia, 451 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1971)). This practice, ap-
proved in Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920) (see supra notes 36-38 and accompany-
ing text), apparently was disapproved in Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405 (1981) (see
supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text).
102. Vargas, 615 F.2d at 957.
103. Id. at 959-60.
104. United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 788 (3d Cir. 1978).
105. See McFadden v. United States, 814 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1987) (significant risk of
greater adverse collateral consequences); Jones v. Zimmerman, 805 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1986)
(resolving the issues more economically), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1356 (1987); United States v.
Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412 (3d Cir. 1985) (potential collateral consequences); United States v.
Inmon, 594 F.2d 352 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979); United States ex rel. Hickey
v. Jeffes, 571 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Keller, 512 F.2d 182 (3d Cir. 1975);
United States v. McKenzie, 414 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1969) (impact on pardon and parole), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1019 (1970).
106. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1144 (1982).
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either because of a substantial risk of adverse collateral conse-
quences, 07 or because judicial economy dictates review.108
The Fifth Circuit has applied the concurrent sentence doctrine
more often than other circuits and is its most stalwart defender. 09 In
United States v. Rubin,"0 the court recognized that it had "often
applied the doctrine mechanically without really considering the ad-
verse consequences.""' In Rubin, the defendant appealed convic-
tions on 103 counts of embezzlement, racketeering, income tax
evasion, and failure to keep labor union records. The Fifth Circuit
reviewed and affirmed 101 of the convictions; it declined to review
the remaining two counts, affirming them under the concurrent sen-
tence doctrine.12 After Rubin's petition for certiorari was granted by
the United States Supreme Court, the Solicitor General confessed er-
ror, agreeing with Rubin that the Fifth Circuit had erred in applying
the concurrent sentence doctrine because of the substantial likeli-
hood that the unreviewed convictions would adversely affect parole
consideration. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and re-
107. See United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1217 (1985); United States v. Walker, 677 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1982).
108. See United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1987).
109. See Note, Benton v. Maryland, supra note 47, at 293-94. The exceptional vitality of
the concurrent sentence doctrine in the Fifth Circuit is disclosed by a LEXIS search tallying
the number of times each of the circuits has used the term "concurrent sentence doctrine" or
"concurrent sentence rule" since Benton was decided:
COURT TIMES USED
District of Columbia 3
First Circuit 8
Second Circuit 23
Third Circuit 12
Fourth Circuit 8
Fifth Circuit 147
Sixth Circuit 18
Seventh Circuit II
Eighth Circuit 49
Ninth Circuit 91
Tenth Circuit 13
Eleventh Circuit 8
These figures, of course, include cases in which the terms are merely mentioned and the doc-
trine is neither applied nor rejected. Likewise they exclude cases in which the doctrine is in
fact applied or discussed but these precise terms are not used. Nonetheless, they give an idea
of the relative popularity of the doctrine in the various circuits.
110. 591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979) (on remand from 439 U.S.
810 (1978)).
111. Id. at 280.
112. United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 439
U.S. 810 (1978).
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manded the case to the Fifth Circuit. On remand, the Fifth Circuit
looked closely at the impact of the United States Parole Commission
guidelines. Of Rubin's 101 convictions, eighty-four were for embez-
zling a total of approximately $55,000. The two unreviewed convic-
tions were for embezzling a total of approximately $330,000. The
court recognized that the severity rating for the offense of embezzle-
ment was based on the amount of money embezzled. If the two un-
reviewed convictions were not considered, Rubin's offense would
carry a severity rating of "high"; when they were considered, the
rating became "very high." The fact that the unreviewed convictions
would result in a higher severity rating did not mean that use of the
concurrent sentence doctrine would necessarily harm the defendant,
however, because the Parole Commission does not automatically
drop reversed convictions from its consideration. Rather, it looks to
the 'actual offense behavior' which can be reliably established"
and will consider a reversed conviction whenever the reversal was on
grounds not relating to guilt or innocence." 3 The Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that application of the concurrent sentence doctrine to a chal-
lenge related to guilt or innocence is inappropriate.1 14 On the other
hand, the concurrent sentence doctrine may be applied where the de-
fendant complains of error unrelated to guilt or innocence, such as
denial of a motion to suppress. ' 15
Rubin's command that a sufficiency of the evidence contention be
reviewed on appeal was soon modified. In United States v.
Cardona'6 the court considered an appeal by three defendants from
their convictions on one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute heroin and on two counts of possession with intent to dis-
tribute heroin. The defendants complained that the evidence was in-
sufficient as to each of the three counts. The court reviewed the
evidence as to Counts 1 and 2 and recognized that the evidence on
Count 3 was "less substantial. ' " 7 However, rather than scrutinize
113. Rubin, 591 F.2d at 281.
114. Id. at 281-82; see United States v. Vasquez-Vasquez, 609 F.2d 234, 235 n.2 (5th Cir.
1980).
115. See United States v. Alfrey, 620 F.2d 551 (5th Cir.) (defendant argued document
erroneously admitted because the government failed to comply with the notice requirement of
FED. R. EVID. 803(24)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 938 (1980); Vasquez-Vasquez, 609 F.2d at 235
(defendant claimed court erred in denying motion to suppress because statements were taken
after an illegal stop; fourth amendment violation apparently had no effect on the reliability of
the statements). In both these cases the Fifth Circuit concluded that the concurrent sentence
doctrine applied because the Parole Commission would give the same weight to the conviction
even if it were reversed.
116. 650 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981).
117. Cardona, 650 F.2d at 57.
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the evidence for sufficiency, the court adopted the approach the Dis-
trict of Columbia had taken in United States v. Hooper."8 Thus, the
court retained the rule to the extent that it would forbear reviewing
the validity of the convictions; however, instead of affirming the un-
reviewed convictions it would vacate them. The Fifth Circuit further
ruled, "If the government subsequently determines that the interests
of justice require reimposition of the sentences, then it may interpose
its objections and these vacated convictions would then be open to
appellate review." 1,9
The Fifth Circuit has ruled that the concurrent sentence doctrine is
not applicable where the defendant correctly complains that the con-
victions are multiplicitous. 120 For the most part, however, the Fifth
Circuit has continued to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine, ei-
ther in its pure form, by affirming the conviction,' 21 or by vacating
the conviction when the possibility of adverse collateral conse-
quences cannot completely be gainsaid.'" Of course in some cases
the court has declined to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine,
most commonly because adverse consequences are apparent.' 21
118. 432 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
119. Cardona, 650 F.2d at 58. In a later case, the Fifth Circuit explained that "the effect
of this judicial action is to suspend imposition of the sentences." United States v. Montema-
yor, 703 F.2d 109, 116 (5th Cir.) (challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a drug case),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983).
120. United States v. Osunegbu, 822 F.2d 472, 481 (5th Cir. 1987). The court stated that
'"[wihere separate sentences on two or more counts are impermissible, the error is not cured
by the existence of concurrent sentences."' Id. (quoting United States v. Bradsby, 628 F.2d
901, 905 (5th Cir. 1980)). But see United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir.) (apply-
ing the concurrent sentence doctrine and vacating a perjury conviction which the defendant
contended was multiplicitous), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985).
121. United States v. Canales, 744 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Nelson, 733
F.2d 364 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 937 (1984); Williams v. Maggio, 714 F.2d 554 (5th
Cir. 1983) (applying concurrent sentence doctrine to habeas corpus); United States v. Caggi-
ano, 667 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. MacPherson, 664 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. Unit B
Dec. 1981).
122. United States v. Adi, 759 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Harrelson, 754
F.2d 1182 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985); United States v. Diaz, 733 F.2d 371
(5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Harris, 727 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1182 (1985); United States v. Hausmann, 711 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Mon-
temayor, 703 F.2d 109 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983).
123. See United States v. Heffington, 682 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1108 (1983); United States v. Khamis, 674 F.2d 390, 394-95 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982) (declining to
apply the concurrent sentence doctrine because the court perceives at least two adverse conse-
quences: an effect on parole and an effect on the defendant's alien status); United States v.
Hernandez, 662 F.2d 289, 291 (5th Cir. Oct. 1981) (declining to apply the concurrent sentence
doctrine because "the invalidity of his convictions on counts 2 and 3 is readily apparent");
United States v. Garcia, 655 F.2d 59, 63 n.4 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981) (concurrent sentence
doctrine not applicable because conviction carried a "special parole term"); United States v.
Salinas, 654 F.2d 319, 322 n.6 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981) (concurrent sentence doctrine not
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The Sixth Circuit has applied the doctrine on occasion, 2 4 but more
often does not. 2 1 In at least one case, the Sixth Circuit applied the
doctrine but instead of affirming the unreviewed conviction, the
court vacated it.126
The Seventh Circuit has declined to apply the doctrine on many
occasions because of the possibility of undesirable collateral conse-
quences. 2 7 On the other hand, the court has applied the doctrine ab-
sent possible adverse consequences. 2 8
The Eighth Circuit applied the doctrine relatively freely in the
years immediately after Benton was decided,' 29 but in the mid-
appropriate because a $5,000 fine "adds materially to the pains and penalties he would suf-
fer"), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 833 (1983); United States v. Kreimes, 649 F.2d 1185, 1193 n.7 (5th Cir. Unit
B July 1981) (declining to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine because "the merits of this
point of appeal bear some comment").
124. See United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017
(1986); United States v. Klayer, No. 79-5431 (6th Cir. Sept. 16, 1982) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
U.S. App. file) (applying the doctrine even though the evidence was weak where the defendant
presented no meaningful collateral effects); United States v. Grunsfeld, 558 F.2d 1231 (6th
Cir. 1977) (minimal merit to contentions and no meaningful collateral effect), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 872 (1978); Etheridge v. United States, 494 F.2d 351 (6th Cir.) (no meaningful collat-
eral effects of the lesser sentences), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1025 (1974).
125. The Sixth Circuit has twice refused to apply the doctrine on the ground that judicial
economy is outweighed by the defendant's interest in clearing his record of a federal felony
conviction. See United States v. Stewart, No. 84-1084 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 1985) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, U.S. App. file); United States v. Maze, 468 F.2d 529, 536 n.6 (6th Cir. 1972),
aff'd, 414 U.S. 395 (1974). The court has also refused to apply the doctrine in order to ad-
dress a significant legal question. See United States v. Greer, 588 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1978)
(noting a split of authority in other circuits), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979); see also United
States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1142 (1986); United States
v. Parisi, 709 F.2d 1511 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 936 (1983); Gentry v. United States,
533 F.2d 998 (6th Cir. 1976) (impact on pardon and parole); United States v. Jones, 533 F.2d
1387 (6th Cir. 1976) (possibility of adverse consequences), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 964 (1977);
United States v. Garner, 529 F.2d 962 (6th Cir.) (possibility of prejudice on parole), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 850 (1976).
129. United States v. Hockaday, Nos. 84-5210, 84-5211 (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 1984) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, U.S. App. file).
127. E.g., United States v. Rodgers, 755 F.2d 533 (7th Cir.) (not applied where the court
cannot rule out collateral effects), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 907 (1985); Cramer v. Fahner, 683
F.2d 1376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982); Wright v. United States, 519 F.2d 13
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 932 (1975); Crovedi v. United States, 517 F.2d 541 (7th Cir.
1975); United States v. McLeod, 493 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Tanner, 471
F.2d 128 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972); Davie v. United States, 447 F.2d 480
(7th Cir. 1971) (declining to apply doctrine because Benton cast doubt on its continuing viabil-
ity).
128. See United States v. Peters, 617 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hamilton,
420 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1970) (the 39-year-old defendant had been an habitual criminal since
the age of 14).
129. See United States v. Whitlock, 442 F.2d 1061 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Besse-
sen, 433 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); Tarvestad v. United
States, 418 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970); Kauffmann v. United
States, 414 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 962 (1970).
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1970's, the court began to question usage of the doctrine. 30 None-
theless, the court continued to apply the doctrine in appropriate
cases.' In one of its most recent pronouncements on the subject,
however, the Eighth Circuit declined to apply the concurrent sen-
tence doctrine, noting that "[c]ourts have long expressed doubt of
the propriety of applying the concurrent sentence doctrine in cases
on direct appeal."' 32
The Ninth Circuit, like the Fifth, was long a "staunch supporter
of the doctrine." '133 In United States v. DeBright, 3 4 however, the en
banc court rejected the use of the concurrent sentence doctrine.' 35
The panel opinion in DeBright13 6 provided an exhaustive history of
the concurrent sentence doctrine in the Ninth Circuit. The court rec-
ognized that it had applied the doctrine freely for some forty years,
presumably because of the circuit's large case load. 3 7 The court also
recognized that it had applied the doctrine for some twenty-five
years, until 1971, without mentioning adverse collateral conse-
quences.' More to the point, the court recognized that even since
1971 it had on occasion applied the concurrent sentence doctrine
130. See United States v. Holder, 560 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1977) (declining to apply the
doctrine because of the possible effect on parole consideration); Sanders v. United States, 541
F.2d 190 (8th Cir. 1976) (suggesting that the rule should be limited to application in cases
involving collateral attacks on convictions as opposed to direct appeals), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1066 (1977); United States v. Belt, 516 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1975) (seriously questioning the
doctrine's applicability where the crimes are different and are serious), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1056 (1976).
131. See Lee v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Kirk, 723 F.2d
1379 (8th Cir. 1983) (advised caution in applying doctrine, but held doctrine is applicable
where there was no prejudicial spillover and defendant received a 40-year sentence not subject
to parole and would be nearly 90 years of age in 40 years), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 930 (1984);
United States v. Wilson, 671 F.2d 1138, 1139 n.2 (8th Cir.) (doctrine applicable where the
impact on parole was doubtful and other collateral consequences were "highly speculative"),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994 (1982); United States v. Rapp, 642 F.2d 1120 (8th Cir. 1981) (doc-
trine applicable where review is on collateral attack, defendant received probation on all
counts, and there was no prejudicial spillover).
132. United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d 1305, 1311 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 233
(1986).
133. Note, Benton v. Maryland, supra note 47, at 291-92.
134. 730 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
135. Id. at 1260.
136. United States v. DeBright, 710 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1983), modified sub nom. United
States v. De Bright, 730 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
137. Id. at 1406 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Barker, 675 F.2d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir.
1982); Maxfield v. United States, 152 F.2d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 794
(1946)).
138. The first reported decision in which the Ninth Circuit mentions adverse collateral
consequences is United States v. Moore, 452 F.2d 576, 577 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
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without mentioning collateral consequences. 3 9 The court described
this practice of affirming without discussion of collateral conse-
quences as "particularly disturbing.' ' 40 Yet, the court recognized,
the alternative is to canvas all possible collateral consequences. Do-
ing so, however, diminishes the utility of the concurrent sentence
doctrine because the one rationale for its application, judicial econ-
omy, is all but eradicated. The DeBright panel relied on the Second
Circuit opinion in United States v. Vargas14' to determine that con-
sideration of collateral consequences destroys the utility of the con-
current sentence doctrine. The panel declined, however, to follow
Vargas and reject the doctrine. Instead it revitalized one of its own
1971 opinions, United States v. Fishbein. 42 Fishbein adopted the ap-
proach taken by the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v.
Hooper.143 Inexplicably, however, Fishbein had never been followed
in the Ninth Circuit; rather the court had continued to apply the doc-
trine and affirm rather than vacate the unreviewed convictions. 44
The DeBright panel concluded its discussion of the concurrent sen-
tence doctrine with the prophetic remark, "Finally we would add
that if for any reason the Hooper-Fishbein approach proves unsatis-
factory in the long run, we should abandon the concurrent sentence
doctrine entirely rather than return to the practice of affirming con-
victions regardless of their underlying lawfulness." 1 45
In fact, the Hooper-Fishbein approach proved unsatisfactory in
the short run. On motion for rehearing the government convinced
the en banc court that vacating convictions without reviewing their
merits "would impermissibly infringe on the prosecutorial function
of the executive branch." 146 Having held that vacating an unreviewed
conviction was inappropriate, the Ninth Circuit made good the pa-
nel's promise and completely rejected further use of the concurrent
sentence doctrine. The court cited two major reasons. First, it deter-
139. DeBright, 710 F.2d at 1406 (citing, e.g., United States v. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d 985,
992 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980); United States v. Jabara, 618 F.2d 1319,
1329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 446 U.S. 987 (1980)).
140. DeBright, 710 F.2d at 1406.
141. 615 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1980).
142. 446 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972).
143. 432 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See supra text accompanying note 82.
144. DeBright, 710 F.2d at 1407.
145. Id. at 1409.
146. United States v. De Bright, 730 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc). The court
was also influenced by the "substantial practical difficulties with the implementation of
Hooper." Id. The court noted that were the government to seek reinstatement of a vacated
conviction at some time in the future, the result would be a fragmented appeal. Furthermore,
the work of the Parole Commission might be delayed while reinstatement was sought.
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mined that since a fair review of adverse collateral consequences
would "ordinarily be very time-consuming," ,47 judicial economy was
not, in fact, well served by application of the doctrine. Furthermore,
the court ruled that application of the concurrent sentence doctrine
infringed upon the defendant's statutory right to an appeal.1 48
After the Benton decision, the Tenth Circuit continued to apply
the concurrent sentence doctrine on occasion,' 49 but by no means
uniformly.' 50 In a 1982 opinion, the court gave extended considera-
tion to the doctrine.' 5 ' Recognizing that "[a] growing realization that
adverse collateral consequences inexorably flow from most criminal
convictions has prompted both courts and commentators to criticize
frequent application of the doctrine,'1 2 the court declined to apply
it. The court also declined to vacate the convictions. Thus, the Tenth
Circuit ordinarily affords a defendant full review.' 53
Shortly after it was created, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit'54 adopted the approach of the old Fifth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Cardona' and of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals in United States v. Hooper.'5 6 The court applied
the concurrent sentence doctrine and declined to review the convic-
tions bearing concurrent sentences, but rather than affirming those
convictions, it vacated them.'57 The Eleventh Circuit, however, does
not always take this approach. Sometimes it simply applies the con-
147. Id. at 1258.
148. Id. at 1259 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)). Section 1291 grants federal criminal
defendants the right to have a conviction reviewed by a court of appeals.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Gamble, 541 F.2d 873 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Bath, 504 F.2d 456 (10th Cir. 1974) (no discernible adverse consequences); United States v.
Sawyer, 485 F.2d 195 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974); United States v.
Tager, 479 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1973) (no prejudicial spillover), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162
(1974).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Stoker, 522 F.2d 576 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Masters, 484 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1973).
151. See United States v. Montoya, 676 F.2d 428 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 856
(1982).
•152. Id. at 432.
153. See Newman v. United States, 817 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Varoz,
740 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282 (10th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983).
154. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was established on No-
vember 1, 1981. In the first opinion handed down, the court ruled that cases decided prior to
the close of business on September 30, 1981 by the "Old Fifth" or "Former Fifth" were
binding precedent in the new Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206
(1 1th Cir. 1981).
155. 650 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981).
156. 432 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
157. United States v. Butera, 677 F.2d 1376 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1108
(1983).
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current sentence doctrine in its pure form and affirms the conviction
rather than vacating it.' Additionally, in some cases the court has
simply declined to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine. 15 9
By 1986, while only the Ninth Circuit had rejected the doctrine
outright,16° the First, Second, Eighth and Tenth had all but done so
in opinions sharply circumscribing or criticizing it.161 The Third,
Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits had never relied on the doctrine
to an appreciable extent and had no occasion to review their posi-
tions. While the newly-created Eleventh Circuit seemed relatively
open to use of the doctrine, 62 several of its judges had criticized the
Fifth Circuit's failure to reconsider it while they were still members
of that court. 163 Only the Fifth Circuit remained a proponent of the
doctrine and continued to apply it regularly.
IV. THE VALIDITY OF THE CONCURRENT SENTENCE DOCTRINE-
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
As the foregoing survey shows, in the eighteen years since Benton
was handed down, a number of questions relative to the vitality of
the concurrent sentence doctrine have arisen. Some, such as the doc-
trine's interaction with a defendant's statutory right to appeal, impli-
cate its validity. Others, such as its contribution to judicial
efficiency, implicate only its utility. In light of Ray v. United
States,'64 it seems unlikely that these questions will be addressed by
158. See United States v. Fuentes-Jimenez, 750 F.2d 1495, 1497 (11th Cir. 1985) (the court
found "no basis for believing that the appellant will suffer adverse collateral consequences"
and no effect on parole), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1160 (1986); United States v. Plotke, 725 F.2d
1303 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 843 (1984); United States v. Johnson, 700 F.2d 699,
701 (llth Cir. 1983).
159. See United States v. Brewer, 807 F.2d 895, 896 n.l (11th Cir.) (declining to apply
doctrine where the parties fail to discuss it, indicating that the parties should assist the court
in determining the possibility of adverse collateral consequences), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1909
(1987); United States v. Rosen, 764 F.2d 763 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061
(1986); United States v. Davis, 730 F.2d 669, 671 n.2 (11th Cir. 1984) (declining to apply the
doctrine where "the government has made no affirmative showing that the likelihood of harm
to the defendant in the form of adverse collateral consequences is so remote as to be insignifi-
cant").
160. United States v. De Bright, 730 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
161. O'Clair v. United States, 470 F.2d 1199 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921
(1973); United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d
1305 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 233 (1986); United States v. Montoya, 676 F.2d 428
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 856 (1982).
162. United States v. Fuentes-Jimenez, 750 F.2d 1495, 1497, (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1160 (1986); United States v. Butera, 677 F.2d 1376 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1108 (1983).
163. See United States v. Warren, 612 F.2d 887, 895 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (Roney, Hill,
Clark, Fay and Vance, J.J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980).
164. 107 S. Ct. 2093 (1987). Ray is discussed infra notes 203-211 and accompanying text.
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the United States Supreme Court in the foreseeable future. Nonethe-
less, the questions that impact on the validity of the doctrine deserve
attention. 1
65
A. Does the Concurrent Sentence Doctrine Violate the Federal
Right to Appeal from a Judgment of Conviction?
The United States Constitution does not provide a defendant with
the right to appeal from a judgment of conviction.166 However:
Present federal law has made an appeal from a District Court's
judgment of conviction in a criminal case what is, in effect, a
matter of right. That is, a defendant has a right to have his
conviction reviewed by a Court of Appeals, and need not petition
that court for an exercise of its discretion to allow him to bring the
case before the court. 1
67
165. If use of the doctrine is a valid exercise of judicial power, a decision as to whether to
use it in the interests of judicial economy would seem to be peculiarly within the province of
each court.
166. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 606 (1974); see McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684
(1894):
An appeal from a judgment of conviction is not a matter of absolute right, inde-
pendently of constitutional or statutory provisions allowing such appeal. A review
by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case, however grave the
offence of which the accused is convicted, was not at common law and is not now a
necessary element of due process of law. It is wholly within the discretion of the
State to allow or not to allow such a review. A citation of authorities upon the point
is unnecessary.
McKane, 153 U.S. at 687.
167. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 441-42 (1962) (citations omitted). Cop-
pedge relies on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1294. These statutes, on their face, create jurisdiction in
the court of appeals but do not create a right to an appeal in a litigant. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1252.
Coppedge also cites FED. R. CRIM. P. 37(a), which is now incorporated in the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure. FED. R. CRIM. P. 37 advisory committee's note. The Rules assume a
right of appeal in a defendant. The Coppedge Court also refers to Carroll v. United States,
354 U.S. 394, (1957), where the Court, in giving a brief history of federal appellate jurisdic-
tion, noted that "it was 100 years before the defendant in a criminal case, even a capital case,
was afforded appellate review as of right." Id. at 400-01 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in orig-
inal). Similarly, in Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 n.3 (1977), the Court noted, "A
general right of appeal in criminal cases was not created until 1911. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, 36
Stat. 1133." The Act cited, like 28 U.S.C. § 1291, appears to create jurisdiction in the court
as opposed to a right in the defendant. Finally, as the De Bright court noted, Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32(a)(2) directs a district court judge to inform a defendant of "his right
to appeal." United States v. Ete Bright, 730 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
Apparently, the right of appeal is in the nature of an implied right of action allowed by 28
U.S.C. § 1291. For discussions of how the Court determines whether to imply a private right
of action, see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374-82
(1982); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
Although the extent to which a defendant has a right of appeal is unclear, an extended
discussion of that issue is beyond the scope of this Article. For purposes of this Article, it is
assumed that a defendant has a right to bring the entire case before the court of appeals.
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The existence of a defendant's right to have his conviction re-
viewed on appeal implicates the validity of the concurrent sentence
doctrine. If a defendant has a right to appellate review, can the
court, in the interest of judicial economy, deny him that right? Ac-
cording to the Ninth Circuit, it cannot. That court relied upon the
argument that use of the concurrent sentence doctrine offends the
right to appeal as support for its rejection of the doctrine, ruling that
it "impinges upon the defendant's statutory right."' 68 This conten-
tion was also articulated by the dissenting judges in United States v.
Warren, 169 who argued:
Persons convicted of federal crimes are entitled to an appeal. That
right is empty if no court decides the appeal. Under the concurrent
sentence doctrine, which is founded solely on a concern for judicial
economy, convictions resulting in concurrent sentences often go
unreviewed, and yet affirmed, despite "the obvious fact of life that
most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal
consequences."170
One answer to this attack on the doctrine may be that the use of
the doctrine is like a partial affirmance without opinion; since an
entire case may be affirmed without opinion,' 17 it follows that part
of a case may be as well. An affirmance pursuant to the concurrent
sentence doctrine, however, is different from other affirmances in
that when the court affirms under the doctrine, it is not expressing
an opinion on the correctness of the judgment affirmed. It is, in-
stead, expressly declining to consider the validity of the judgment,
and affirming it nonetheless. An affirmance without opinion, on the
other hand, indicates that the judgment is valid and an opinion
would have no precedential value.17  The existence of a defendant's
right of appeal is better reconciled with the appellate court's exercise
168. De Bright, 730 F.2d at 1259.
169. 612 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.) (Roney and Hill, JJ., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 956 (1980).
170. Id. at 896 (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55 (1968)).
171. FE. R. App. P. 36.
172. See,.e.g., 5TH CIR. R. 25:
When the court determines that any of the following circumstances exists: (a)
judgment of the district court is based on findings of fact that are not clearly erro-
neous; (b) the evidence in support of a jury verdict is not insufficient; (c) the order
of an administrative agency is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole; (d) summary judgment, directed verdict or judgment on the pleadings is sup-
ported by the record; and the court also determines that no error of law appears and
an opinion would have no precedential value, the judgment or order may be af-
firmed or enforced without opinion.
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of discretion to simply decline to rule on the appeal by analogizing
the court's action to a harmless error ruling. Harmless error is typi-
cally invoked with respect to particular aspects of a trial, not with
respect to a verdict or judgment. For example, when a defendant ar-
gues to the appellate court that his conviction should be reversed be-
cause the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, a court may,
in an appropriate case, respond, "Yes, that was (or may have been)
error. But the evidence is sufficient, absent the erroneously admitted
evidence, and it was not so prejudicial as to require in fairness that
you be retried." In other words, the error was harmless. In applying
harmless error theory to justify the concurrent sentence doctrine, a
court is going a step further and saying, "Yes, it may be that the
particular conviction you complain of is invalid, but we need not
decide whether or not that is the case because the conviction at issue
works you no harm." The State of Maryland proffered this theory in
Benton.'73 The Solicitor General, on the other hand, suggested that
the doctrine be treated "as a principle of judicial efficiency." ''7 4 The
Supreme Court declined to apply the doctrine or to discuss the rela-
tive merits of these positions beyond noting that the doctrine might
survive "as a rule of judicial convenience."' 75 When the Court sub-
sequently applied the doctrine in Barnes, thereby making it perfectly
clear that it had in fact survived, the Court simply stated, "[W]e
decline as a discretionary matter to reach these issues." 1 76 In fact, the
arguments of the State of Maryland and of the Solitor General are
not competing but complementary. One expresses a rule, the other a
rationale. Thus a conviction may be affirmed under the concurrent
sentence doctrine because it is harmless and no viable right of the
defendant is infringed; additionally, it should be so affirmed because
to do so promotes judicial efficiency.
While treating the doctrine as an application of harmless error to
justify its use, an alternative theory also suffices. The Supreme
Court addressed the concurrent sentence doctrine in Benton in the
context of an argument by the State of Maryland that the doctrine
deprived the Court of jurisdiction by rendering the controversy
moot. The Court disagreed, holding that "our recent decisions on
the question of mootness in criminal cases make it perfectly clear
that the existence of concurrent sentences does not remove the ele-
173. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 792 (1969).
174. Id. at 791-92.
175. Id. at 792.
176. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 848 n. 16 (1973).
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ments necessary to create a justiciable case or controversy. ' 17  The
Court then added:
It may be that in certain circumstances a federal appellate court, as
a matter of discretion, might decide (as in Hirabayash) that it is
"'unnecessary" to consider all the allegations made by a particular
party. The concurrent sentence rule may have some continuing
validity as a rule of judicial convenience. That is not a subject we
must canvass today, however. It is sufficient for present purposes
to hold that there is no jurisdictional bar to consideration of
challenges to multiple convictions, even though concurrent
sentences were imposed. 17
Benton responded to the contention that the doctrine deprived the
court of jurisdiction. The argument is not that the court lacks juris-
diction to review the challenged conviction, but that the court lacks
discretion not to review the challenged conviction. An appropriate
response is to complete the analysis begun in Benton.
The Benton ruling that the concurrent sentence doctrine does not
deprive the court of jurisdiction may be taken a short step further; a
more complete statement is that the concurrent sentence doctrine
does not deprive the court of jurisdiction as a matter of law. That is,
the fact that the challenged conviction bears a sentence concurrent to
a longer sentence does not conclusively establish that no case or con-
troversy exists. This is not to say, however, that the appeal from the
challenged conviction might not be moot as a matter of fact. Such an
appeal will be moot as a matter of fact when no collateral conse-
quences flow from the concurrent conviction. If this view is taken,
the doctrine does not conflict but instead dovetails with the federal
right of appeal. The doctrine applies where no collateral conse-
quences exist, and the court will not and may not review the chal-
lenged conviction.179 On the other hand, where collateral
consequences exist the court is confronted with a justiciable case or
controversy which it will resolve.
177. Benton, 395 U.S. at 790.
178. Id. at 791 (footnote omitted).
179. Interestingly, Hirabayashi is a case in which there may well have been no collateral
consequences, legal or otherwise. Because Hirabayashi deliberately challenged laws he be-
lieved unconstitutional, 320 U.S. 81, 84 (1943), stigma is not an issue. His act of civil disobe-
dience may be seen as a badge of honor, not infamy. Because he received two concurrent
sentences of only three months duration, it is unlikely that the second negatively impacted on
his parole. Id. Finally, both because his "crimes" were acts of civil disobedience and because
they were inextricably linked to each other, the potential for incremental harm as a result of
the second conviction was minimal.
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B. Does the Concurrent Sentence Doctrine Violate a Defendant's
Right to Substantive Due Process?
One commentator has suggested that application of the concurrent
sentence doctrine may run afoul of substantive due process guaran-
tees. 8 0 The argument is premised, however, on the assumption that a
defendant in a federal criminal case has a fundamental right to ap-
peal. 181 The commentator recognizes that no fundamental right to
appeal "per se" exists, but argues that "when such review is pro-
vided by statute, a fundamental right of access to the court
arises."'1 8 2 That begs the question, however, since a court's use of the
concurrent sentence doctrine hardly denies access to the court; it
cannot occur unless the right of access has been afforded the defen-
dant and the case is before the court. The determinative fact remains
that no fundamental right to appeal a federal criminal conviction ex-
ists.183
Since the right to appeal is not fundamental, the concurrent sen-
tence doctrine does not violate a defendant's substantive due process
rights unless it lacks a rational basis. 8 The expressed rationale of
courts applying the doctrine, that it increases judicial efficiency, sup-
plies the rational basis necessary to justify its use in the face of a
challenge grounded in substantive due process.'85 Of course, if the
doctrine is treated as jurisdictional under the analysis set forth in the
preceding section, no substantive due process issue can arise. 186
180. Note, Judicial Procedure, supra note 9, at 742.
181. Id. at 745.
182. Id.
183. See also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 370-72 (3d ed.
1986).
184. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); cf. Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134, 141-44 (1972) (Texas statute requiring filing fees from political candidates war-
ranted close scrutiny).
185. The same author argues that use of the doctrine offends equal protection, relying in
large part on Justice White's concurrence in Benton. Note, Judicial Procedure, supra note 9,
at 749. While Justice White raised the specter of an equal protection violation, he also dis-
missed it:
The unreviewed count is often one which, but for the concurrent sentence rule,
the prisoner would have a right to challenge, either directly or on collateral attack.
Arguably, to deny him that right when another man, convicted after a separate trial
on each count, or sentenced consecutively, could not be denied that right under the
applicable state or federal law, raises an equal protection question. But clearly so
long as the denied review is of no significance to the prisoner the denial of equal
protection is not invidious but only theoretical.
Benton, 395 U.S. at 799 (White, J., concurring).
186. The same is true, of course, of equal protection issues.
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C. Is to Vacate to Err? Does the Concurrent Sentence Doctrine
Violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine?
For the most part the executive branch of the government supports
the use of the concurrent sentence doctrine; however, it takes issue
with the practice of vacating rather than affirming an unreviewed
conviction.8 7 The Solicitor General takes the position that "the
practice of vacating unreviewed convictions offends important sepa-
ration of powers principles, it devalues the role of juries and district
courts, and it places the unreviewed conviction in a unique and ex-
tremely uncertain status.' ' 8 Of these contentions, only the first ad-
dresses the validity of the doctrine; the second and third raise policy
considerations.
The Solicitor General's position is that the decision to prosecute
rests with the executive, and the court cannot override that decision
by vacating either a valid conviction or the sentence imposed pursu-
ant to a valid conviction. The Solicitor General contends that to do
so would override the prosecutorial function that is committed to the
executive branch. 89
The Supreme Court consistently has "long acknowledged the Gov-
ernment's broad discretion to conduct criminal prosecutions, includ-
ing its power to select the charges to be brought in a particular
case."' 90 The Court, however, also has ruled that "broad though
that discretion may be, there are undoubtedly constitutional limits
upon its exercise," 9' and has subjected this discretion to judicial re-
view. 92
The argument that the doctrine of separation of powers forecloses
the judiciary from vacating convictions under the concurrent sen-
187. Reply Memorandum for the United States at 20, Ray v. United States, 107 S. Ct.
2093 (1987) (No. 86-281).
188. Id. Ray, as petitioner, also argued that application of the doctrine offends separation
of powers. Brief for Petitioner Ray at 40-43, Ray v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2093 (1987) (No.
86-281). Of course, Ray concludes that full review must be afforded while the Solicitor Gen-
eral argues that the conviction at issue should be affirmed pursuant to the concurrent sentence
doctrine.
189. The Solicitor General cites the Constitution's direction that the President "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed" as the source of prosecutorial power and discretion in
the Executive Branch. Reply Memorandum for the United States at 20 (citing U.S. CoNsT. art.
II, § 3).
190. Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 859 (1985); see Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 454, 457 (1868) (also recognizing the power of the district attorney to "enter a nolle
prosequi at any time before the jury is empanelled for the trial of the case, except in cases
where it is otherwise provided in some act of Congress").
191. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978).
192. See Ball, 470 U.S. at 860 (reviewing the government's discretion to prosecute under
two statutes).
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tence doctrine supposes a rigid division of authority between the ex-
ecutive branch and the judiciary. In the context of a dispute between
Congress and the Executive, the Supreme Court has decisively re-
jected that view of separation of powers. 193 The question is not
whether vacating presumptively valid convictions has any impact on
the executive branch's prosecutorial discretion, but rather to what
extent "it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its con-
stitutionally assigned functions."'' 94 Even where "the potential for
disruption" exists, it may be "justified by an overriding need to pro-
mote objectives within [the judiciary's] constitutional authority." 195
Thus the fact that the executive branch has discretion as to the prose-
cutorial decision does not mean that the judiciary lacks discretion to
vacate a presumptively valid conviction in the interests of judicial
economy, at least absent a showing by the government that the con-
viction has significance. 96
D. Collateral Use of Unreviewed Convictions
In his concurring opinion in Benton, Justice White defended the
concurrent sentence doctrine, but he expressed concern that an at-
tempt to use an unreviewed conviction to a defendant's detriment
might offend constitutional guarantees. 197 While the possibility of
abuse is undeniable, no indication exists that it has ever occurred. 98
The most cogent reason is that the government has no need to use
the unreviewed conviction. Typically, the unreviewed conviction is
tied to a lawful conviction-affirmed on its merits-which stems
from the same criminal transaction.' 99 Moreover, if the court was
193. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) ("the Court [in
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)] squarely rejected the argument that the Constitu-
tion contemplates a complete division of authority between the three branches"); see also
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (discussing how separation of powers doctrine
affects the Court's subject matter jurisdiction).
194. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443.
195. Id.
196. Both the Fifth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeal give the
government leave to interpose objections when the interests of justice so require. See United
States v. Cardona, 650 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hooper, 432 F.2d 604,
606 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
19g. 395 U.S. 784, 799-800.
198. Extensive research has uncovered no reported case which records a complaint that a
conviction which had been affirmed under the concurrent sentence doctrine was used for im-
peachment, or to increase punishment for a subsequent crime, or otherwise to the detriment
of the defendant.
199. See Benton, 395 U.S. at 805 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Assuming that the doctrine was
properly applied in the first instance, use of the unreviewed conviction for impeachment
should be harmless error. See supra text accompanying note 65. But see O'Clair v. United
States, 470 F.2d 1199, 1203 (1st Cir. 1972) ("there is always the extra stigma imposed upon
one's reputation").
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correct in its application of the concurrent sentence doctrine in the
first instance, then it should not cause adverse consequences on pa-
role .200
An affirmed but unreviewed conviction is likely to become impor-
tant only if the underlying conviction is set aside. In that event, the
reviewing court would have the record before it and could consider
the previously unreviewed conviction on its merits.
While unlikely, the possibility exists that unanticipated collateral
use of the unreviewed conviction may be made even though the un-
derlying convictions remain intact. For example, laws affecting sen-
tencing and parole can change and a conviction that does not seem
to make a difference when it is affirmed may prove to be important
at a later date. The problem, at that point, is how best to afford the
defendant relief. The relief sought would be review of the convic-
tion; the difficulty would be in providing access to a reviewing court.
Those courts that vacate rather than affirm have provided a solu-
tion; they typically include in their order a proviso that if the inter-
ests of justice so require, the prosecutor may seek reinstatement of
the conviction and sentence.2 0 l The court should afford the same
right to the defendant: the defendant should be given leave to reinsti-
tute the appeal if the interests of justice so require. 20 2
V. 18 U.S.C. § 3013 AND RAY V. UNITED STATES
In 1986 the Supreme Court effectively forestalled the use of the
concurrent sentence doctrine in all federal felony convictions. By
analogy, the same holds true for federal misdemeanor convictions.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 110-15. Likewise, it should not affect sentences
for future state or federal crimes. See Note, Benton v. Maryland, supra note 47, at 301-02. Of
course, sentencing standards change constantly. For an interesting discussion of the Federal
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, see Van Graafeiland, Some Thoughts on the Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1291 (1986).
201. E.g., United States v. Hockaday, Nos. 84-5210, 84-5211 (6th Cir. Oct. 23, 1984)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. App. file); United States v. Cardona, 650 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir.
1981); United States v. Hooper, 432 F.2d 604, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
202. Although the courts do not refer to the retention of jurisdiction in ruling that the
prosecutor may move for reimposition of the conviction, that appears to be the applicable
theory. The concept of inherent judicial power authorizes the retention of jurisdiction. tee I
J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.60[6], at 633 (2d ed.
1986). Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1982) provides the basis for retention of jurisdiction:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, mod-
ify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree or order of a court lawfully
brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such
appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be"
had as may be just under the circumstances . ...
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However, the doctrine remains viable in collateral actions for post-
conviction relief from federal convictions and in the state courts.
A. The Bell Tolls, Faintly
Late in 1986, the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in order to review the role of the concurrent sentence doctrine in the
federal courts. 203 The petitioner, John William Ray, had been con-
victed on one count of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to
distribute, and two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute. He was sentenced to concurrent seven-year prison terms
on all three counts, as well as to concurrent special parole terms of
five years on the two possession counts. The court of appeals af-
firmed his conspiracy conviction and one of the possession convic-
tions on the merits; it then applied the concurrent sentence doctrine
and declined to review the second possession conviction. 0 4
After the writ of certiorari was granted, the Solicitor General real-
ized, and pointed out to the Court, that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3013(a)(2)(A), 20 5 Ray also had been assessed $50 on each count, for a
total of $150. The Court's response to this information was to rule:
Since petitioner's liability to pay this total depends on the validity
of each of his three convictions, the sentences are not concurrent.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the
cause is remanded to [the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals] so that it
may consider petitioner's challenge to his second possession
conviction. 206
The entire opinion comprises only two paragraphs; it is not, on its
face, significant. Its significance arises from the fact that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3013(a)(2)(A) requires that an assessment of $50 be made "on any
person convicted of [a felony] offense against the United States."
Furthermore, three circuit courts of appeal have had occasion to rule
on the application of the statute to convictions on multicount indict-
203. Ray v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 454 (1986).
204. Ray v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2093 (1988).
205. Section 3013(a)(2)(A) is part of the Victims of Crime Assistance Act of 1984. The
Act, inter alia, establishes a fund for the benefit of victim assistance programs, and orders
that assessments be imposed upon conviction. The assessments are paid into the fund. S. REP.
No. 497, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3607,
3610-11.
206. Ray, 107 S. Ct. 2093-94 (1987).
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ments and all have agreed that the statute directs an assessment on
each count of a conviction.20 7
For all its subtlety, the Ray opinion leaves no room for doubt as
to the application of the concurrent sentence doctrine to a conviction
carrying an assessment of at least $50. The Supreme Court did not
remand to the court of appeals for consideration of that question;
rather it ruled, "It now appears, however, that petitioner is not in
fact serving concurrent sentences." 20 Since the statute commands
that each federal felony conviction carry an assessment of at least
$50, it also now appears that the concurrent sentence doctrine can no
longer be utilized with respect to federal felony convictions.20 9
B. Is There Life After Death? A Consideration of Federal
Misdemeanors, Collateral Proceedings, and State Offenses
1. Federal Misdemeanors
The remote possibility that the concurrent sentence doctrine con-
tinues to be applicable to federal misdemeanors is hardly worth con-
sidering. The statute that requires a $50 assessment for each felony
conviction also requires a $25 assessment for each misdemeanor con-
viction.2 10 In some instances, the strictures of judicial decisionmak-
ing require splitting hairs, 2t1  but application of the concurrent
sentence doctrine to federal misdemeanors is not an issue likely to
provoke a $25 distinction.
207. See United States v. Dobbins, 807 F.2d 130, 131-32 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Donaldson, 797 F.2d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Pagan, 785 F.2d 378, 381 (2d
Cir. 1986).
208. Ray, 107 S. Ct. at 2093.
209. Should the statute be repealed, the doctrine might enjoy renewed vitality. Absent that
circumstance, it seems for the most part unavailable. But see United States v. Mayberry, 774
F.2d 1018 (10th Cir. 1985) (ruling that 18 U.S.C. § 3013 is not applicable to assimilative
crimes). In the odd case where a district court judge omits the assessment, it would seem that
a remand to correct the sentence would be more appropriate than seizing on the omission and
applying the doctrine. See United States v. Pagan, 785 F.2d 378, 380-81 (2nd Cir. 1986). But
see United States v. Stovall, 825 F.2d 817, 824 (5th Cir. 1987), where the court held that
absent an objection by the government, where the trial court failed to levy the assessments the
case would not be remanded, and in the absence of any assessments, the concurrent sentence
doctrine would be applied. That portion of the opinion was deleted by order after the govern-
ment pointed out that the offenses had preceded enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3013. United States
v. Stovall, 833 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1987).
210. 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(l)(A) (Supp. I 1984).
211. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987) (moving components of a stereo
system in order to record their serial numbers was a search, but recording the numbers was
not a seizure).
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2. Collateral Attacks on Federal Convictions
Because Ray was decided on petition for writ of certiorari follow-
ing affirmance of Ray's conviction on direct appeal, it does not
speak to the viability of the concurrent sentence doctrine in collateral
attacks on federal convictions. By far the most common postconvic-
tion proceeding is an action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In fact, it
has been said that "[a] federal prisoner seeking relief from his fed-
eral sentence has Section 2255 as his exclusive remedy. ' ' 21 2 As to fed-
eral prisoners in custody, section 2255 is coextensive with the writ of
habeas corpus, which it supplants as a remedy.213 The question, then,
is whether the concurrent sentence doctrine may still be used in ac-
tions filed under that section.
Section 2255 provides that:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act
of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that
the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States, or that the court was without jurisidiction to
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the
maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral
attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate,
set aside or correct the sentence. 21 4
Assuming that a petitioner can meet the "in custody" requirement
of the statute, 215 it would seem that if part of the sentence imposed
was an assessment which had not yet been paid, Ray would apply
and the concurrent sentence doctrine could not be used. If the assess-
ment has been paid, the question would seem to be whether section
212. Baker v. Sheriff of Santa Fe County, 477 F.2d 118, 119 (10th Cir. 1973); see United
States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185-86 (1979). The writ of coram nobis may be available,
United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954), but only where an action pursuant to section
2255 will not lie. Burns v. United States, 321 F.2d 893, 896 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
959 (1963). At any rate, consideration of coram nobis is unnecessary here, because one of the
prerequisites to its availability is a showing that the petitioner presently suffers adverse conse-
quences as a result of the conviction that is being attacked. Hirabayashi v. United States, 627
F. Supp. 1445, 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (citing United States v. Dellinger, 657 F.2d 140, 144
n.6 (7th Cir. 1981)). Such a showing would preclude application of the concurrent sentence
doctrine.
213. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962); see 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 591, at 423-24 (2d ed. 1982).
214. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982).
215. A prisoner in custody may challenge a concurrent sentence even though he will not be
entitled to release if his challenge is successful. Grimes v. United States, 607 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir.
1979); see Close v. United States, 450 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1068
(1972); Sciberras v. United States, 404 F.2d 247, 249 (10th Cir. 1968).
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2255 allows a petitioner to recover an assessment. If it does, as in
Ray, the sentences are not concurrent for purposes of section 2255.
On the other hand, if section 2255 does not allow recovery of the
assessment, for purposes of a section 2255 proceeding the sentences
are concurrent and the doctrine can be applied.
While one may argue that the interests of justice require that a
petitioner who succeeds in having a conviction vacated should be en-
titled to recover any assessment paid, both section 2255 and the con-
stitutional writ of habeas corpus protect a liberty interest, not an
economic one. 216 Though an action to recover an assessment col-
lected pursuant to an invalid conviction may lie, it will not lie under
section 2255 or the writ of habeas corpus. Section 2255 and the writ
of habeas corpus remedy illegal restraint; while an unpaid assess-
ment may be considered an illegal restraint if liberty is conditioned
on its being paid, an assessment that has already been paid is argua-
bly no longer an illegal restraint on liberty.21 7 Thus the concurrent
sentence doctrine may have continuing validity in collateral actions
for postconviction relief from federal convictions, in that it may be
applied where either no assessment was made, '218 or where an assess-
ment was made and has been paid.
3. The Concurrent Sentence Doctrine in the State Courts
The concurrent sentence doctrine has never enjoyed widespread
popularity in the state courts.21 9 One reason advanced to account for
the lack of state court use of the doctrine is that state law is far more
likely to forbid multiple punishment for a single offense than is fed-
eral law. 220 Another factor may be the prevalence of state recidivist
statutes, 22 1 but perhaps the most salient factor is the subliminal im-
pact of the type of crime being considered.
216. See L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES §§ 3, 42 (1981).
217. It appears that a sentence of a fine alone does not give rise to "custody" within the
meaning of the section. Id. § 43, nn.64-67 and accompanying text. Assuming that it does not,
however, it is still possible that a petitioner who was in custody and had also paid a fine, and
who could avail himself of section 2255, would automatically be entitled to recovery of the
fine if he were successful in vacating the sentence. See Davis v. Muellar, 643 F.2d 521, 524 n.3
(8th Cir. 1981) (stating in dictum that "habeas corpus relief would include return of the
posted bond").
218. This class includes assimilative crimes, United States v. Mayberry, 774 F.2d 1018,
1021 (10th Cir. 1985), and convictions obtained before 18 U.S.C. § 3013 was enacted in 1984.
219. Note, Judicial Procedure, supra note 9, at 733-35; Note, Benton v. Maryland, supra
note 47, at 285-87, 295-97.
220. Note, Judicial Procedure, supra note 9, at 733-34 n.85; Note, Benton v. Maryland,
supra note 47, at 285.
221. Comment, supra note 9, at 390.
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Crimes against the person are peculiarly within the province of the
states (with their police power) as opposed to the federal govern-
ment. Thus state appellate courts regularly decide the appeals of de-
fendants convicted of, inter alia, murder, assault, and rape. The
federal courts have occasion to consider such crimes, but far less fre-
quently. Consider the Supreme Court cases in which the doctrine has
evolved and been applied: Locke, involving violation of embargo
and importation laws; Claassen, involving violation of banking laws
by embezzlement of funds; Pierce, involving violation of the espio-
nage act by the circulation of pamphlets; Hirabayashi, involving the
violation of military curfews and reporting orders; and Barnes, in-
volving the possession, forgery and uttering of stolen treasury
checks. Only Benton involved behavior that is criminal because of
the threat it poses to personal security (burglary), and Benton was
tried and convicted in the courts of the State of Maryland.
What these cases have in common is that the convictions carrying
concurrent sentences do not also carry separate stigma. This is true
even of Benton, where the crimes were burglary and larceny. In state
criminal convictions, however, this is often not true. Murder carries
a different stigma than assault; armed robbery carries a different
stigma than embezzlement; and rape carries a different stigma than
kidnapping. The list could go on, but the point is that because of the
police power being lodged in the states, state criminal offenses are
more likely to carry a separate, distinct, and significant stigma. 222
The infrequent use of the concurrent sentence doctrine by the state
courts may reflect intuitive sensitivity to the heightened element of
stigma.
This is not to say that state courts never apply the doctrine. 223 It is
alive and well, for example, in Maryland, 224 Missouri, 225 and Wash-
222. Arguably some crimes are so horrible that independent convictions cannot possibly
cast the defendant in a worse light. See State v. Bowman, 36 Wash. App. 798, 807-08, 678
P.2d 1273, 1279 (Ct. App. 1984) (court applied the doctrine after finding that stigma was not
an issue and noting that: "[1]f the evidence of the prosecuting witnesses . . . is to be believed,
to describe [the defendant] as a beast is to libel the entire animal kingdom") (quoting State v.
Goebel, 36 Wash. 2d 367, 380, 218 P.2d 300, 307 (1950).
223. This Article does not purport to offer an exhaustive survey of state courts' positions
on the concurrent sentence doctrine; rather the Article discusses the approach of a representa-
tive group of states.
224. See Smith v. State, 51 Md. App. 408, 427, 443 A.2d 985, 995 (Ct. Spec. App. 1982)
(treating it as jurisdictional); Jennings v. State, 8 Md. App. 312, 319, 259 A.2d 543, 546-47
(Ct. Spec. App. 1969) (treating it as potentially jurisdictional).
225. See State v. Neal, 661 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Davis, 624
S.W.2d 72, 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
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ington. 226 Other states, while aware of the doctrine, appear never to
have utilized it.227 While Rhode Island has consistently refused to ap-
ply the doctrine, it has not foreclosed that possibility. 2 1 Pennsyl-
vania and Wisconsin, on the other hand, have expressly declined to
adopt the doctrine.2 29 And Georgia has rejected it, at least in appeals
from denials of petitions for writ of habeas corpus. 230 Florida first
considered the concurrent sentence doctrine in the context of a peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus.2 3' James Frizzell was serving two con-
current ten-year sentences, one imposed as a result of a conviction of
robbery and the other imposed as a result of a conviction of uttering
a forged instrument. Frizzell's motion to vacate the robbery convic-
tion and sentence was denied. He then filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Florida. The state conceded
the fact that Frizzell would not be entitled to release from confine-
ment, even if he were successful in attacking the robbery conviction
and sentence, no longer barred habeas relief. 22 The state, however,
contended that the court might still apply the concurrent sentence
doctrine and decline to reach the merits.
Frizzell was not an appropriate case for application of the concur-
rent sentence doctrine. The conviction Frizzell wished to challenge is
arguably the more serious of the two because it carries the greater
stigma. As the Supreme Court of Florida noted, it might well have
serious collateral consequences, such as a negative effect on Friz-
226. In State v. Briceno, 33 Wash. App. 101, 102-03, 651 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Ct. App.
1982), the court listed the factors it would consider in determining whether to apply the doc-
trine and decided to apply it. For other cases in which it has been applied, see State v. Bow-
man, 36 Wash. App. 798, 678 P.2d 1273 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Clark, 34 Wash. App. 173,
659 P.2d 554 (Ct. App. 1983); In re Rice, 24 Wash. 2d 118, 163 P.2d 583 (1945) (applying the
doctrine on appeal from denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus). But see State v.
Birgen, 33 Wash. App. 1, 4, 651 P.2d 240, 242 (Ct. App. 1982) (criticizing the concurrent
sentence doctrine for failing to take collateral consequences into account, and stating that in
Washington "it is of limited applicability outside the review of multiple punishments under
the double jeopardy clause").
227. See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Price, 495 So. 2d 1311 (La. 1986); State v. Han-
cock, 27 Ariz. App. 164, 167, 552 P.2d 220, 223 (Ct. App. 1976) (defining the doctrine but
expressing "no view" on its validity).
228. See State v. Doyon, 416 A.2d 130, 133 (R.I. 1980).
229. Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 220 Pa. Super. 415, 420, 289 A.2d 153, 155 (Super. Ct.
1972) (calling it "a doctrine never accepted in Pennsylvania"); Austin v. State, 86 Wis. 2d
213, 218, 271 N.W.2d 668, 670 (1978) ("We have never adopted that doctrine, and we twice
specifically refused to apply it .... "); Blaszke v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 81, 91, 230 N.W.2d 133,
139 (1975) ("We decline to adopt the concurrent sentence doctrine.").
230. Atkins v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 330, 216 S.E.2d 89 (1975).
231. See Frizzell v. State, 238 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1970).
232. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968); Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335 (1968).
Both of these cases involved consecutive sentences.
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zell's opportunity for parole, or his ability to be chosen as a trusty. 233
Unfortunately, the court did not follow that line of reasoning in de-
clining to apply the doctrine. Rather, it mistakenly conceived of the
doctrine as simply a different label for the prematurity rule, describ-
ing it as "an outgrowth of the historic requirement of the writ of
habeas corpus that one seeking the writ must be entitled to immedi-
ate discharge from all custody if successful in his petition. ' '234 The
court then recited the rationale for dispensing with the prematurity
rule in habeas litigation-that justice is not served by delay in con-
sidering a challenge to a conviction because evidence will be lost and
witnesses will disappear-and leapt to the conclusion that the con-
current sentence doctrine, likewise, will never bar consideration of
the merits of convictions challenged by petition for writ of habeas
corpus .235
The court's error lies in seeing the concurrent sentence doctrine as
simply a variant of the prematurity rule. The prematurity rule was
rejected because it simply delayed litigation of a claim that would, in
all likelihood, become ripe. 2 6 The concurrent sentence doctrine, on
the other hand, is properly applied only when, in all likelihood, the
interests of justice will never require consideration of the merits. 23 7
233. Frizzell, 238 So. 2d at 69.
234. Id. at 68. While some of the same policy considerations underlie the development of
both rules, the concurrent sentence doctrine has a completely separate genesis. See supra text
accompanying notes 9-42.
235. The court held: "From henceforth this Court will consider the merits of petitions for
habeas corpus even though the petitioner is not entitled to be released if successful in his
attack on a conviction, and regardless of whether the sentences are concurrent or consecu-
tive." Id. at 69.
236. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968). A prisoner might die before his claim became
ripe, or other circumstances (such as a pardon) might render it moot. Ordinarily the claim
would not simply go away. Rather, it would reappear, and the passage of time would render
determination of the merits all the more difficult.
237. The Supreme Court of Georgia cited Frizzell in Atkins v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 330, 216
S.E.2d 89 (1975), in which it ruled that the judicial convenience served by application of the
concurrent sentence doctrine in habeas litigation was outweighed by the interests of justice. In
that determination the court relied on statistics supplied upon request by the Attorney Gen-
eral. The Attorney General had informed the court that only 25076 of all habeas petitions
attack concurrent sentences, and in approximately 90% of those petitions, the testimony and
evidence relating to one conviction will also relate to the other. Presumably an even smaller
percentage of petitions attack only a sentence which is concurrent to and lesser than another
sentence. The Atkins opinion interweaves, somewhat confusingly, two separate strands of
thought. On the one hand, it foreshadows the analysis of the Ninth Circuit in DeBright, see
supra text accompanying notes 133-48; on the other hand, it embodies the confusion the Su-
preme Court of Florida, as expressed in Frizzell, over the nature of the concurrent sentence
doctrine.
In Atkins, the petitioner, who was serving a life sentence for felony murder and a 10-year
sentence for armed robbery, sought to attack both sentences. The court agreed with the peti-
tioner that the armed robbery was a lesser included offense of the felony murder and the
conviction was therefore void under Georgia law.
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Frizzell notwithstanding, in 1977 Florida's Third District Court of
Appeal applied the concurrent sentence doctrine in the context of a
direct appeal.2 3 Subsequent opinions have confirmed that the con-
current sentence doctrine is viable on direct appeal in Florida. 239 It
will not, however, be applied where the defendant's complaint is that
the trial judge sentenced him without benefit of a sentencing guide-
lines scoresheet, which is required by the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure.2 40 Frizzell has never been reconsidered, but it would seem
that if the doctrine is applicable in direct appeals it would also be
applicable in habeas litigation.
The question at hand is not whether states do use the concurrent
sentence doctrine, but whether they may. The answer to that ques-
tion appears to be yes. The mandatory assessment which was levied
in Ray applies only to federal convictions. It has long been recog-
nized that where a fine is levied, the concurrent sentence doctrine
does not apply.24' But most state convictions do not carry fines or
assessments and, thus, they will be distinguishable from Ray on their
facts.
The United States Supreme Court has not held the doctrine uncon-
stitutional. In fact, it has approved its use where appropriate.2 42 Ray
has limited applicability in the state courts. Thus the state courts are,
for the most part, free to use the concurrent sentence doctrine.2 43
VI. CONCLUSION
In Ray v. United States, the Supreme Court seized on the fact that
each federal felony conviction carried a $50 assessment, and used
that fact to largely abrogate the concurrent sentence doctrine with-
238. Mathis v. State, 348 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 186
(Fla. 1978).
239. See, e.g., Foxx v. State, 392 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Jacobs v. State, 389 So.
2d 1054 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
240. Uptagrafft v. State, 499 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
241. See Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 304-05 (1978) ($500 fine); United States v.
Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 361 (2d Cir. 1978) ($5000 fine). Until Ray, it was not entirely clear that
a fine of $50 would foreclose application of the doctrine.
242. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 841 (1973); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 791 (1969). Even the circuit courts of appeal which have rejected the doctrine have done
so as a matter of policy rather than as a matter of constitutional necessity. See supra notes 81-
163 and accompanying text.
243. The state courts may use the doctrine on direct appeal or in collateral postconviction
proceedings such as habeas corpus. Likewise, the federal courts may continue to use the doc-
trine in adjudicating postconviction challenges to appropriate state convictions since neither
18 U.S.C. § 3013 nor Ray applies.
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out evaluating it on the merits.2 44 Because Ray does not foreclose use
of the doctrine in collateral federal proceedings or in state proceed-
ings, 245 the validity vel non of the doctrine deserves consideration
nonetheless.
This Article has considered the arguments that the doctrine is inva-
lid and found them wanting. The doctrine does not offend the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine; 246 it does not violate a defendant's federal
right to appeal, 247 or substantive due process or equal protection
rights; 248 and should the application of the doctrine prove to have
been erroneous, other remedies are available to compensate.2 49 It
may, however, as the Ninth Circuit contends, be more trouble than it
is worth, 250 but whether a court finds it useful is a matter appropri-
ately left to each court.
Though the doctrine is analytically sound, it is nonetheless trou-
bling. The concept that the federal courts of appeals, bulwarks of
liberty, may decline even to review an allegedly invalid conviction
unsettles many an observer. 25 ' No doubt the troubling nature of the
doctrine underlies the Supreme Court's jettisoning of it.
Ironically, the Court has managed to eliminate the doctrine, which
is itself a mechanism for avoiding review of convictions on their mer-
its, in an opinion which avoids consideration of the doctrine on its
merits. Yet because of the doctrine's continued, albeit truncated vi-
tality, the Court may yet have to resolve the many unanswered ques-
tions that surround the concurrent sentence doctrine.
244. 107 S. Ct. 2093. The Court could have treated the assessment as so minimal as to be
insignificant, as least as to a nonindigent defendant. But see United States v. Donaldson, 797
F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 1986). Congress referred to the assessments as "nominal." S. REP. No. 497,
98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 3607, 3619. It
should be noted that the purpose is to fund relief for victims, not to penalize the defendant.
Id.; Donaldson, 797 F.2d at 127.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 212-43.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 187-96.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 166-79.
248. See supra note 180 and text accompanying notes 180-86.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 201-02.
250. See United States v. De Bright, 730 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
251. See, e.g., Note, Judicial Procedure, supra note 9.
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